



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

# PAPERS READ

BEFORE THE

## ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY.

---

- I.—*Commentaries*. By Lieut.-General A. JOCHMUS. (*Written in 1830 and 1834.*)\*—1. *On the Expedition of Philip of Macedon against Thermus and Sparta*; 2. *On the Military Operations of Brennus and the Gauls against Thermopylæ and Ætolia*; 3. *On the Battle of Marathon, &c.*; 4. *On the Battle of Sellasia, and the Strategic Movements of the Generals of Antiquity between Tegea, Caryæ, and Sparta.* With Maps and Plans.

Communicated by SIR RODERICK I. MURCHISON.

*Read, June 8, 1857.*

1. *Expedition of Philip of Macedon against Thermus and Sparta.*


ON the ruins of Thermus, the ancient bulwark of Ætolia, has since been erected the small monastery of Vlochos, where, during the Greek revolution, the captains of Ætolia so often, and always successfully, defended themselves against the Turkish invaders. Some inconsiderable stone walls (*tambouri*) or redoubts have sufficed, in a position by nature almost impregnable, to impose awe on enemies even of great number. Such is the strength of the ancient acropolis of Thermus, that it can be attacked only on the south-east—that is, on the side which overlooks the lake of Vrachori, anciently that of Trichonium. The citadel crowns the summit of a conical mountain, inaccessible on other sides.

There are two roads which lead from Vrachori, that is, from the great plain round the modern lakes of Angelo Castro and Vrachori direct to Thermus; one nearly in a direct line, the other following for some distance the bed of the Thermissus. These two roads unite at the point where the last ascent to the

---

\* The author was at that time a Captain on the Staff of General Sir Richard Church, in Greece, and subsequently in the Bavaro-Greek War Office. The *Commentaries* were made on the sites of ancient Thermus and Sparta.

Movements  
of the  
MACEDONIAN ARMY  
at the  
TAKING OF THERMUS.



citadel begins; but they are so steep, difficult, and narrow, that it is impossible to attack the acropolis on these several points, where a handful of men would frustrate all the efforts of the assailants, who could only approach one by one.

From the side that faces the lake of Vrachori on the other hand, the access is easier, and there a sufficiently considerable front of attack might be developed. Thermus is reached in this direction by a road which starts from the neighbourhood of Couvélos, near the borders of the lake. M. de Pouqueville, the last author of any note that has written on this part of Greece, has called this spot *Cernelos* (and places Trachinium close to it); but this must be an error in the manuscript, for in the country it is called Couvélos.

We shall refer what has been said respecting the particular position of the ancient citadel of Thermus, and the manner in which it can be attacked, to the expedition against this capital by that Philip, King of Macedon, who was contemporary with Aratus; and in following that able general through his subsequent campaign to the battles that took place near Sparta, we shall present certain reflections and illustrations on one of those great and isolated military conceptions that history offers from age to age as extraordinary occurrences.

Polybius, in the fifth book of his general history, gives the summary of these memorable events; and the observations we are about to make on his recital, which are the result of studies made on the ground itself, will have the two-fold advantage of showing the operations of the Macedonian general in their true point of view, and of removing the errors that have been introduced into the accounts or commentaries of certain modern authors, and more particularly of M. de Pouqueville. (*Histoire ae la Grèce*, chap. lxxxviii.) According to Polybius—

“The King, having left his baggage behind him with a proper guard, began his march from Linnæa in the evening; and when he had gained the distance of about 60 stadia, he ordered the troops to take their supper, and, having allowed a short time for repose, he again set forwards, and, continuing his journey all night, arrived before break of day upon the river Achelôus, between Stratus and Conopé. His intention was to fall suddenly upon the place called Thermus, before the inhabitants could be able to receive the news of their approach. Leontius clearly saw that this design must evidently be attended with success. . . . He pressed the King to encamp upon the river Achelôus, that the troops, who had marched all night, might enjoy some rest. . . . But Aratus, on the other hand, well knowing how soon in all such enterprises the favourable moment might be irrecoverably lost, and perceiving also that the purpose of Leontius was plainly to obstruct the progress of the war, urged the King to proceed without delay, and not suffer the occasion to escape. Philip, who was already much displeased with the whole conduct of Leontius, approved of the advice, and, having passed the river, continued his route in haste towards Thermus, burning and destroying the country as he marched. Leaving on the left hand, Stratus, Thestia, and



Agrinium; and on his right, Conopé, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and Phœteum, he arrived at a town called Métapa, which was situated in the entrance of those parts that led along the lake Trichonis, and was distant from Thermus about 60 stadia. The Ætoliæ fled from the place upon his approach, and the King posted in it a body of 500 men, as well to cover his entrance as to secure also his retreat back again through the passes. For the country that lay along the borders of the lake was rough and mountainous, and covered all with woods, so that the passage through it was extremely close and difficult. Philip entered the defiles, placing in the van the mercenaries, &c. . . . The left was covered by the lake to the length of thirty stadia. Having gained the end of the defiles, they came to a village that was called Pamphïa. The King, when he had posted a body of troops in this place also, continued his march forwards to Thermus, through a road that was not only steep and rough, but surrounded on all sides by lofty precipices, so that in many parts it was not to be passed without great danger. The whole height also of the ascent was almost 30 stadia. But the Macedonians pursued their way with so great diligence and vigour that they soon gained the summit and arrived at Thermus while it was yet full day. The King fixed his camp near the city, and from thence sent away the troops to ravage all the villages and neighbouring places. They pillaged the houses of the city likewise, which were not only filled with corn and every kind of necessaries, but with great quantities of rich and costly furniture. . . . For such was the strength and situation of the city that it was considered as the citadel of all Ætoliæ; and indeed, before this time, no enemy had ever ventured to approach it.—(*Hampton's Polybius*, lib. v. chap. 1.)

“The King, taking with him everything that could be carried or removed, began his march back again from Thermus by the same way by which he had arrived. . . . He resolved to pass through the defiles with the quickest haste, not doubting that the Ætoliæ would take advantage of the difficulty of the way, and fall upon him in his retreat. And this, indeed, soon happened.” (Polybius goes on to describe the unsuccessful attack of the troops under Alexander of Trichonium upon the rear of Philip's army, and then continues.) “The rear, setting fire to Pamphïa as they marched, passed the defiles with safety, and joined the rest of the army, who were encamped near Métapa, expecting their arrival. The King razed this city to the ground, and the next day advanced to a town called Acræ. On the following day he again decamped, and, wasting all the country as he passed, arrived near Conopé and rested there during one whole day. He then continued his march along the river Achelôus towards Stratus; and having passed the river he for some time stopped his march.” (Then follows a description of an attack on the rear by the garrison of Stratus.) “After this attempt the Ætoliæ remained quiet within the city, while the others pursued their march with safety, and joined the rest of the army and the vessels.”—(lib. v. chap. 2.)

We then trace the Macedonian King, having come unexpectedly from Leucas, after he had left his baggage at Limnæa, advancing during a night march to the banks of the Achelôus, between Conopé and Stratos, where he arrived before break of day, with the intention of pushing on thence by a single march to Thermus, which he wished to surprise. Without giving any rest to his troops, he continued his expedition with great rapidity, passed the Achelôus, leaving on his left hand Stratos, Thestia, and Agrinium, and on his right Conopé, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and Phœteum, and arrived at Métapa, situated at the entrance of the defiles which extend along the lake of Trichonium, and at a distance of 60 stadia from Thermus.

Here the narrative of Polybius becomes somewhat obscure, for it might be inferred from the text, that after having made his preliminary arrangements for the attack, the king had continued his march along the lake. But if we consider, on inspecting the map, that in that case the lake must have been *on his right*, and that the historian on the contrary expressly states, a few lines afterwards, that "*the left* of the Macedonian army was covered by the lake," it is easily understood how Philip, after reaching Métapa, made a change of front—a movement in fact necessary, if from this place, where he left a part of his army, he wished to march on Thermus, as will be seen on examining the annexed plan; for his army, halting at Métapa, had already passed beyond Thermus, since the first of these towns must have been situated at Couvélos, where are still to be seen the ruins of an ancient town and fortress.

Not only does Métapa, thus determined, and situated on an isolated hill between the lake and the mountains, cover the entry of the defiles, but its military position is so excellent and so strong, that the King of Macedon and the skilful Aratus would at a glance have necessarily chosen it as the immediate pivot of the operations against Thermus.

In measuring with the watch the 60 stadia from Couvélos (or Métapa) to the citadel of the capital of Ætolia, there will be found about half-way, the bed of the torrent called Lycochori, "and the ascent thence to Thermus is 30 stadia." The ancient village of Pamphias, which Philip wisely caused to be occupied, must therefore have been near the banks of this torrent. If, in addition, we calculate the entire distance from Stratos to Thermus, which the king reached with his army when it was "still open daylight," we shall be persuaded that he could not have passed *beyond* Couvélos; for

	Hrs.	Min.
From Stratos to the modern village of Zapandi it is,	}	1 20
including the passage of the ford at the Achelous, a distance of .. .. .		
From Zapandi to Vrachori .. .. .	0	50
From Vrachori to Couvélos .. .. .	3	0
From Couvélos to Thermus .. .. .	2	30
	<hr/>	
	7	40

measured at a pace of 3 English miles per hour.

From Stratos to Couvélos the road is through a wide and fine plain; but the 2½ hours from the latter place to Thermus are very fatiguing, there being considerable ascents and descents.

An army, however unembarrassed by baggage, cannot effect this journey in less than 9½ or 10 hours; and if we reckon the additional time it must have taken Philip to execute his preparatory manœuvres at Métapa, for the purpose of occupying that

town and Pamphlia, it may be conceived with what great diligence he must have ascended to Thermus in order to reach it when it was still full day, for it will be seen that he could not have made a "longer" march.

The nature of the places is still the same. In the neighbourhood of Thermus, the hand of man has made no change in these savage retreats that have for so many ages been abandoned to the wild beasts which at present are its sole inhabitants.

We may still, at a glance, determine "the obscure and covered spots" where the 3000 Ætolians hid themselves, who, with Alexander of Trichonium, entered Thermus (as soon as Philip had evacuated it) for the purpose of attacking the Macedonian rear-guard. The reader will recollect what has been said of the road which on the side of the plain of Vrachori conducts into the citadel. All this part of the mountains is covered with impenetrable woods, and Alexander's 3000 men could in a great part have concealed themselves at the distance of an arrow-shot from the place, without their presence being at all suspected.

These peculiarities have led me to believe, that without going far wrong, we may fix Trichonium in the immediate neighbourhood, or on the very site, of Vrachori. This town would in antiquity have given its name to the great lake near it, just as Vrachori does in modern times.\* The most direct road from Stratos to

---

\* ἡ ἑστὴ καὶ Στρατός καὶ Τριχόνιον, ἀρίστην ἔχον γῆν. Strabo, Geog. lib. x., chap. ii. Ætol. et Acarn. This description perfectly applies to a town at or in the immediate vicinity of Vrachori; for the lands there are the most fertile in Western Greece. In the Tauchnitz edition (1819) of Strabo the reading is Τραχόνιον instead of Τριχόνιον, as correctly given in the edition of Korai.

The author of the 'Voyage de la Grèce' (chap. lxxxii.) has entertained a singular idea respecting Stratos, in an attempt to explain Casaubon and Paulmier de Grentménil. "As respects distance," says he, "as the apex of a triangle formed by Alyzia, Anactorium, and Stratos, a position which has strangely puzzled Casaubon and Paulmier de Grentménil in explaining the *κατὰ μέσον ὄδον* (half-way) of Strabo, I think that I can resolve this difficulty. If the reader will bear in mind what I have advanced, he will see that Alyzia, or Candili, is almost under the meridian of Anactorium; but Mount Berganti, or Boubastis, forming a line between the north and the south of Acarnania, has obliged travellers in all ages to make a circuit by Stratos; that is, to proceed nearly nine leagues to the east, in order to go from that place by Limnæa to Anactorium (near Vonitza). Thus may be explained and made consistent the words of the ancient authors, who are always found correct, when tested by the ground as it was when they saw it."

This opinion is altogether erroneous; for there are three roads that leave Candili—one to the left and two to the right—to cross Mount Boubistas, which does not at all divide Acarnania in the sense understood by the author. These roads open—two of them at Zaaverda; the third, called that of Livadia, in the wood of Xilo-Pigado. The road that runs by the sea is at Cape Camillasca, it is true, impracticable for horses; but by making a circuit of half an hour, it is regained on the other side of that promontory, and the journey may be continued thence without difficulty to Zaaverda. From Candili to Vonitza or Anactorium is an easy day's journey; whereas it would take nearly four days to go from Candili, by Stratos and Limnæa, to Anactorium. As the pretended barrier of Mount Boubistas, then, has no existence, either Strabo must be considered as expressing himself vaguely, or else Alyzia is not near Candili. Even if the latter be probable,

Couvélos passes at the foot of the mountain on which Paléo-pyrgo stands, and Philip in following it would have left Trichonium at eight or ten minutes distance *on his right* in proceeding towards Métapa.

This town, according to what has been stated, appears to have existed on the site of the modern Couvélos, that is, to the north of the lake of Vrachori or Trichonium; whereas M. de Pouqueville, and probably led by him, the Chevalier de Lapie, in his map of Greece, places it to the south-east of this lake, at the village of Metarga, fixing Pamphlia close by. The German archæological maps of Kruse have apparently been similarly falsified, after the erroneous data given by the French traveller.

Would Philip, then, on leaving Stratos to go to Thermus, have proceeded first to Couvélos (the true Métapa), thence to Metarga, on the south-east side of the lake, thus going half round it, and then retracing his steps to the neighbourhood of Couvélos, to ascend thence to Thermus? In order to execute such a march as this in a single day, with troops already wearied by a night-march of eight or nine hours from Limnæa to Stratos, and to reach Thermus *while it was yet day*, the King of Macedon must, in fact, like Joshua the Hebrew general, have caused the sun to stop in his course! To make half the circuit of the considerable lake of Vrachori, indeed, by the successive ascents and descents of its jagged banks, would require seven hours' ordinary marching through narrow and difficult defiles. It would have been requisite, moreover, on this strange hypothesis, to return by the same road and lose the same time; and all this to give success to the prince's plan of *surprising* Thermus!

In order, however, to furnish decided proof that Métapa and Pamphlia were situated on the south-east of the lake of Vrachori, M. de Pouqueville (*Hist. de la Grèce*, ch. lxxxiv.) makes Philip march from Thermus, and "*direct his course towards Ætolia Epictétus*," leaving Lysimachia, Trichonium, and Phætium *on his right*. He proceeded then, according to the French author, by Métapa (Metarga?), a town which he destroyed after pillaging Thermus, into the district of Vénético, in which case he must really have left on his right the towns above mentioned!

Now Polybius (*Hist.*, lib. v. ch. 2) announces in precise terms, that "the King, after having, with a body of Illyrians placed in ambuscade on the road from Thermus to Métapa, routed the

we must still admit that the Greek author, in describing Stratos as *half-way* between Alyzia and Anactorium, meant to designate the mountain now called Boubistas, which is in fact at that distance, and might have borne that name amongst the great number of others which it seems to have had in succession. In this case there has been some fault of the copyists of the geographer in transcribing *ἡ Στάτος* instead of *ὁ Στάτος*.

3000 troops of Alexander of Trichonium who harassed his rear-guard, and after having burnt the village of Pamphía, safely passed the defiles, and rejoined the rest of his army that was encamped at Métapa, a town which he razed to its foundations. On the day following, Philip advanced to Acræ, and laying waste the country, he encamped the day after at Conopé, where he rested a day, returning subsequently to Stratos and to Limnæa, where his fleet was stationed.

He did not then go into Ætolia Epictétus (the modern Vénético). In fact, such a march would have been strangely in opposition to the strategic principles adopted on this important occasion by the Macedonian general, who inflicted a fatal defeat on his enemies by attacking them in the heart of their country and wholly destroying their capital, at a time when the Ætolians believed him to be at Leucas, the modern Santa Maura.

The King, then, *in returning* from Thermus, by Métapa, and the road by which he had come, must necessarily have had Phætium, Trichonium, and Lysimachia on his *left*, supposing that *in going* they were on his *right*. Very possibly, however, in his progress towards Conopé (as we have indicated in the map), he might have left northwards the town of Trichonium (supposing it to have occupied the site of the modern Vrachori), for Polybius says that the king afterwards *ascended* the course of the Achelöus towards Stratos. In any case, however, Lysimachia (near the site of Arsinoë, beyond the lake of Angelo-Castro) would be on his left.

As regards the locality in which Philip halted his army after the march from Acræ towards Conopé (and which Polybius alleges to have been *near that place*), the troops evidently encamped on the left bank of the Achelöus, in the neighbourhood of Calivia, in order to refresh themselves in the cool vicinity of that hamlet; for we find the Prince subsequently *continuing his march along the river-bank* towards Stratos, which he passed in order to offer battle to the Ætolian garrison, which the latter declined.

To the north-east of Stratos, on the left bank of the Achelöus, are the ruins of a considerable ancient town, which I conceive to be those of Thestia. At Paléo-pyrgo, likewise, are some slight remains of an old fortification, apparently Hellenic (perhaps the ancient Agrinium).

The military proceedings of the King in all this expedition are marked throughout with foresight, tact, and vigour of execution. Alike is the consummate general seen in the defiles of Thermus, under the walls of Stratos, and in the retrograde march on Limnæa: and we shall repeat what M. de Folard has written on this head, though in other respects we are far from coinciding with his opinions upon the expedition against Thermus. "The retreats of armies, it may be said, call forth all the very highest efforts of

military skill, profound tactics, experience in marching, knowledge of the mode of crossing rivers, and, in a word, all the characteristics which constitute a great captain, and a warrior of the first order."

This observation may be applied also to the fine strategic movements which the King executed in the course of the campaign against Sparta, undertaken just after his memorable successes in Ætolia. The same principles prevail in both expeditions, viz., boldness of conception, rapidity in marching and manœuvring, energy and brilliancy of execution. Polybius states—

"Philip sailed away from Leucas, and, having wasted the coast of the Hynantheans as he passed, arrived at Corinth with all the fleet, and cast anchor in the harbour of Lechæum. He then disembarked his army; and when he had first sent letters to the confederate cities of the Peloponnesus to appoint the day in which their forces should be ready in arms and join him at Tegea, he immediately began his march towards that city with the Macedonians, and, taking his route by way of Argos, arrived there on the second day: and, being joined by such of the Achæan forces as were then assembled in the city, he continued his march along the mountains, with design to fall upon the Lacedæmonian territory before the people could receive any notice of his approach. Passing, therefore, through those parts of the country that were chiefly destitute of all inhabitants, he appeared, after four days' march, upon the hills that stand opposite to Sparta, and from thence leaving the Menelaion on his right, he advanced forwards to Amyclæ. . . . For marching, as we have already mentioned, from the middle of Ætolia, and having passed, in one day's time, the Ambracian Gulf, he arrived at Leucas, and when he had staid two days, on the third sailed early in the morning; and, wasting the coast of Ætolia as he passed, cast anchor at Lechæum; and from thence marching forward without delay, he gained upon the seventh day the neighbourhood of Menelaion and the hills that overlooked the city of Sparta. So astonishing was this celerity, that those who themselves beheld it could scarcely give credit to their eyes. . . .

"The King, on the first day, fixed his camp near Amyclæ, which is distant from Lacedæmon about 20 stadia. . . . On the next day he decamped, and, destroying the country as he passed, arrived at the place that was called the Camp of Pyrrhus. On the following days he wasted all the neighbouring places, and came and encamped near Cœrnium, and from thence continuing his march to Asini, attempted to take the city. But after some fruitless efforts he again decamped, and ravaged all the country on the side towards the sea of Crete as far as Tænarium. From thence, taking his route back again, and leaving on his right hand the port called Gythium, which is distant from Lacedæmon about 30 stadia, he encamped upon the frontiers of the Helian district."

(The next section by Polybius is occupied with the defeat at Glympium, or Glympes, of the Messenian allies of Philip by the Lacedæmonians under Lycurgus.)

"The King now decamped from the Helian district, and wasting the country on every side, arrived again, after four days' march, in the neighbourhood of Amyclæ, with all his army, about the middle of the day. Lycurgus having, in concert with his friends and officers, regulated all the plan of the intended battle, marched out of the city (of Sparta) with two thousand men, and took possession of the posts round the Menelaion. At the same time he ordered those that were left in the city carefully to observe the time, and, as soon as



they should perceive his signal, to lead out their troops from many parts at once, and range them in order of battle, with their front turned towards the Eurotas, and in the place in which that river flowed nearest to the city. Such was the disposition of Lycurgus and the Lacedæmonians. . . .

“Sparta, if we consider it in its general figure and position, is a city in a circular form, standing in a plain. But the ground, in certain parts that are within the circuit of it, is rough and unequal, and rises high above the rest. Close before the city, on the side towards the east, flows the Eurotas—a river so large and deep that during the greatest part of the year it is not to be forded. Beyond this river, on the south-east of the city, are those hills upon which stand the Menelaion. They are rough and difficult of ascent, and command entirely all the ground between the river and the city. For the river takes its course along the very border of the hills, and the whole space from thence to Sparta does not exceed a stadium and a half in breadth.

“Such was the defile through which Philip, as he returned, must be forced to pass, having on his left hand the city, with the Lacedæmonians ranged in battle, and ready to engage; and on his right, the river and Lycurgus with the troops that were posted on the hills. But, besides these difficulties, the Lacedæmonians, in order more effectually to obstruct his passage, had stopped the course of the river at some distance above the ground which we have mentioned, and forced the waters to flow over all the space that lay between the city and the hills, so that neither the cavalry nor infantry could march that way with safety. The Macedonians, therefore, had no means left for their retreat, but to lead their army close along the very foot of the hills. But as they must then have marched with a very narrow and contracted front, it would scarcely have been possible to resist the efforts of the enemy. When Philip had considered all these difficulties and had held a consultation also with his generals, he judged it necessary that Lycurgus should be first dislodged from his posts upon the hills. Taking with him, therefore, the mercenaries, the peltastæ, and the Illyrians, he passed the river and advanced towards the enemy. When Lycurgus saw what the King designed, he exhorted his troops to perform their duty, and prepared them for the combat. At the same time he gave the signal also to those that were in the city, who immediately ranged them in order of battle before the walls with the cavalry upon their right. Philip, as he approached nearer to Lycurgus, first sent the mercenaries against him to begin the action. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, who were superior in the advantage of their arms and from the situation also of the ground upon which they stood, for some time maintained the fight with the fairest prospect of success.

“But when Philip ordered the peltastæ to advance and support the troops that were first engaged, while himself, with the Illyrians, prepared to fall upon the enemy in the flank, the mercenaries, encouraged by this assistance, pressed the charge with greater vigour than before, while the Lacedæmonians, being struck with terror at the approach of the heavy-armed forces, turned their backs and fled. About a hundred of them were killed in the place, and more than that number taken prisoners. The rest escaped safe into the city. Lycurgus himself, with a small number of attendants, retreated through some private roads and entered the city also in the night. Philip, having posted the Illyrians upon the hills from whence he had dislodged the enemy, returned again to join the rest of the army with the peltastæ and the light-armed troops.

“During this time the phalanx had begun their march from Amyclæ under the conduct of Aratus, and were now arrived near the city. The King, therefore, passed the river with the light-armed forces, the peltastæ, and a body of cavalry, in order to sustain the attack of the Lacedæmonians, till the heavy-armed troops, who continued their march along the sides of the hills,


should have passed through the defile with safety. The Lacedæmonians, advancing from the city, charged first the cavalry of the King; but as the action soon became more general, and was sustained by the peltastæ with the greatest bravery, the victory was again wholly turned to the side of Philip, who drove back the Lacedæmonian cavalry and pursued them even to the gates. He then passed again the river, and closing the rear of all the phalanxes, continued his march forward without any loss.

“He had just now gained the end of the defile when the night suddenly came on, and forced him to encamp without advancing any farther. It happened that the place which the guides were thus compelled, as it were by accident, to mark out for the encampment, was that very ground which an enemy would take by choice, if their intention was to pass beyond the river of Sparta, and to make incursions upon the Lacedæmonian territory. For it was situated at the extremity of this defile of which we have been speaking in the road which leads to Lacedæmon, not only from Tegea, but from all the inland parts of Peloponnesus, and stood close upon the border of the river at the distance of two stadia only from the city. The side that looked towards the river and the city was covered by steep and lofty precipices, which were almost inaccessible; and above these rocks was a level plain, which abounded both with earth and water, and was also disposed so that an army might at all times enter it or retire again with safety. In a word, whoever has once gained possession of this plain, with the precipices likewise that are round it, not only may remain secure against all attacks from the side of Sparta, but is the master also of everything that enters or returns through the defile.

“Philip having here fixed his camp in full security, on the following day sent his baggage away before, and then drew out all his forces in order of battle upon the plain in sight of the city. And when he had stood for some time in that disposition, he then turned aside and directed his route towards Tegea. Arriving at the place in which the battle had been fought between Antigonus and Cleomenes (Sellasia), he there encamped, and on the following day, when he had first viewed all the neighbouring posts and offered sacrifice to the gods upon the mountains Eva and Olympus, he strengthened the rear of his army, and continued his march to Tegea, and having there sold all his booty, he passed from thence through Argos and arrived at Corinth.”—(*Hampton's Polybius*, lib. v. chap. 2.)

The King reached Sparta from Leucas in seven days—four of which were spent in marching from Lechæum near Corinth to the heights of the Menelaion; and “such was the astonishing celerity of his movements, that those even who were eye-witnesses of them could scarcely believe the evidence of their senses.” The sea-voyage from Leucas (Sta. Maura) to Corinth was no doubt very prosperous, especially if we consider that in these seas the winds often blow violently, and for a long time in one and the same direction, and that further, especially in summer, the time of the expedition referred to, dead calms are of equal frequency. Fortune, however, was favourable to the King of Macedon; and in his turn he deserved it by his brilliant movement from Corinth, by Argos and Tegea, to the very gates of Sparta.

Philip having, according to the Greek historian, left the Menelaion to the right, must have passed in his march towards Amyclæ, over the high plateau which flanks on the east this part of the



Eurotas, and the range of moderate hills, on one of which stand the ruins of the temple called Menelaïon ; and in consequence of which the whole range has been wrongly marked in maps “*Mts. Menelaïon.*” He passed the river opposite or near to the height of Amyclæ ; for the Eurotas in summer is almost everywhere fordable ; whereas in winter, and during the spring and autumnal rains, it is often very rapid, and so much swollen that there are only one or two fords in the neighbourhood of Sparta, and even these are sometimes wholly impracticable.

The Macedonian general, after ravaging the whole valley of the Eurotas, as far as the environs of Boea and Gythium, returned to the neighbourhood of Amyclæ, where he encamped with all his army. There he became acquainted with the positions taken up by Lycurgus and the Spartans, who had occupied the heights of the Menelaïon, and the right bank of the Eurotas, on which latter they had also effected an inundation. Polybius, in giving a detailed description of the localities, and the posts occupied by the Lacedæmonians, maintains that the King found the circumstances so critical, and the dispositions made by the enemy so formidable, that, after holding a council of war, he resolved to force the defiles of the Menelaïon.

The Macedonians, in fact, ever since their entrance into the Lacedæmonian territory, had ravaged and laid waste all the hostile provinces ; but there had not been any general engagement. On the contrary, the Lacedæmonians, when surprised, being obliged to retreat behind their walls, had not had it in their power to contend in the open field against the superior force of Philip ; though his allies, the Messenians, had just been defeated at Glym-pium by this same Lycurgus, who attempted to dispute the passage of the King’s army. The words of Polybius (lib. v. ch. 5) are as follow :—“Lycurgus, proud of this little success, returned to Lacedæmon, to be in readiness to defend himself against Philip. He and his friends were of opinion, that the King should not be allowed to leave the country without a battle.”

The glory of the Macedonian arms had been tarnished ; and though it was only their allies who had suffered a slight check, it became them to re-establish their superiority, and not pass near Sparta without evincing a determination to fight. The King, accordingly, with that admirable tact, which he exhibited throughout this war, considered that it would give additional *éclat* to combat the enemy in a position that the latter deemed very strong, though in fact it was only so in appearance. He attacked and completely defeated them, offered them battle afresh the day after his victory, and left the country with glory, and as puissant as he had entered it, leaving Sparta humbled, and the prestige of Macedonian superiority established beyond dispute.

We have traced on the accompanying Plan of the Defiles of the Menelaïon the movements of the battle there, such as they appear to have been on a close inspection of the ground. It is remarkable that Polybius makes no mention of the river Tripy—generally believed to be the ancient Knakion, which runs along the east and south-east sides of the ruins of Sparta, in its course to join the Eurotas, 1,000 metres ( $5\frac{1}{2}$  furlongs) s.s.e. of the last traces of the ancient city. As he omits all mention of this stream, it is clear that the passage of the Eurotas was effected below its confluence, but it is surprising that in the affair on the right bank between Philip's light troops and the Spartans, the historian should have maintained the same silence, although the contest must have taken place on its banks, which, it is true, are much flattened towards the junction of the two rivers, the smaller of which has but little water in summer. As it offered, therefore, no great obstacle, Polybius probably deemed himself no obliged to mention it explicitly by name.

The following explanations of the movements described by Polybius correspond, letter for letter, with those marked in the Plan:—

- a a a.* The Spartans under Lycurgus on the heights of the Menelaïon.
- b b b.* The Lacedæmonian troops in order of battle under the walls of Sparta, fronting the Eurotas, and the cavalry on the right.
- c c c.* The mercenaries of Philip drawn up to attack the heights, and later in the day supported by—
- d d.* The Macedonian peltastæ.
- e.* The King, at the head of the Illyrians, taking in flank the troops of Lycurgus.
- f f.* The Macedonian phalanx crossing the Eurotas.
- g g g.* The light troops and a body of cavalry, after recrossing the Eurotas with the King, drawn up in order of battle against the Lacedæmonian troops on the right bank, in order to protect the heavy armed troops while crossing.
- h.* The Illyrian troops occupying the heights of the Menelaïon after the defeat of Lycurgus.
- A A.* The camp of Philip on leaving the defiles on the elevated plain in front of Sparta, where he offered battle to the Lacedæmonians.


(The remainder of this paper is occupied with notes on the Chevalier Folard's "Observations on the Expedition of Philip into Laconia.")

## *2. On the Military Operations of Brennus and the Gauls against Thermopylæ and Ætolia.*

To the preceding commentaries and reflections on two memorable expeditions, the success of which depended no less on the wisdom of their conception than on the promptitude of their execution, we shall append a few pages relative to an undertaking equally remarkable—the expedition of Brennus and the Gauls against the



Sketch of the  
**EXPEDITION OF THE GAULS**  
 under  
**BRENNUS**  
 against  
**THERMOPYLÆ & CALLIUM.**





Thermopylæ and Ætolia. The invasion of the latter by the road of Callium (the modern Carpenitza) determined the fate of the Greeks who fought in the defiles of Mount Œta. In doing this, we have the twofold object of connecting a narrative of that event, which really was decided in Ætolia, with the account of the taking of its ancient capital, considered to be the key of the country, and, at the same time, of pointing out how the Gauls, under the conduct of an able general, turned the defiles which they were unable to force in front, as had happened to the Persians before them. As has been remarked, the river Sperchius has at all periods proved a fatal obstacle to the invaders of Greece. On its banks, by the side of the Persians and the Gauls, lie the bones of the Bulgarians, led by their king Samuel, as well as those of the French cavaliers who fought under the oriflamme of Count Boniface of Champagne.

The Sperchius and the Pass of Thermopylæ may, however, be turned at a distance, either by an army coming from Thessaly and directing its march towards the Cephissus by way of Callium, or by a force which arrives from Albania, and invades Western Greece by the Macrinoros, in order afterwards to move by its left.

The Thermopylæ, in the present day, are no longer so easy to defend as formerly, yet, at all events, they form a fine position; but Callium (or Carpenitza), which was always regarded as a first-rate strategic point in the Turkish and Venetian wars, and the Macrinoros, are positions, which, along with the Thermopylæ, complete the system of territorial defence of modern Greece (that is, of the provinces south of the Gulfs of Arta and Zeitoun), and thus have become of at least equal importance.

Brennus was the first general of antiquity who perceived the military importance of Callium, as will be seen by his operations during his invasion of Greece which was followed by the capture of Delphi. On the approach of the numerous cohorts of the Gauls—which Pausanias \* has estimated at 152,000 infantry and 20,400 cavalry, each of the latter served by two attendants on foot—the Greek army, which may be reckoned at nearly 30,000 men and a flotilla of Athenian galleys, † were established at the Thermopylæ. The Grecian generals thence detached 1000 foot-soldiers, and the best of their cavalry, towards the right bank of the Sperchius to break down the bridges; but Brennus, having already caused that river to be crossed by 10,000 Gauls, partly by ford, in part by swimming, and the rest in small barks, the Greek corps ordered to prevent their passage fell back on the main body of the army at the Thermopylæ.

Without wasting his time in taking Heraclæa, Brennus, who had

---

\* Pausan., lib. x., cap. xix.

† *Ib.*, lib. x., cap. xx.

conducted his troops to the right bank of the Sperchius, led them to the Pass of the Thermopylæ, which he could not force, and where he suffered a severe check, owing equally to the brave resistance of the Grecian land-forces and to the powerful diversion made by the Athenian galleys.\* Repulsed also, seven days afterwards,† in attempting the passage of Mount Cæta, the Gallic generals were beginning to lose courage, when Brennus, forming one of the greatest conceptions in strategy, resolved to turn at a distance the whole formidable mountain-barrier, which he could not force in front. Pausanias says—

“Having chosen forty thousand foot and eight hundred horse out of his whole army, he gave the command of these forces to Orestorius and Combutis, and ordered them, first of all, to pass into Thessaly over the bridges of the Sperchius, and afterwards invade Ætolia. (Callium was then taken by the Gauls). . . . But the Ætolians, having learnt from certain messengers the calamities which had befallen their country, immediately, with all possible celerity, led back their forces from Thermopylæ to Ætolia; being enraged at the sufferings of the Callienses, and desiring to save those cities which had not yet experienced the fury of the barbarous enemy. . . . But the Barbarians, as soon as they had plundered the houses and temples, and had set the city Callium on fire, returned the same way as they came, to their own people; and the Patrenses alone, of all the Achæans that assisted the Ætolians, opposed the Barbarians with their armed forces, in the use of which they were very skilful. However, they were greatly oppressed, both by the multitude of the Gauls, and despair of success. But then the Ætolians, both men and women, placing themselves in every part of the road, pierced the Gauls with their darts. . . . For out of that great multitude of Gauls, which amounted to forty thousand and eight hundred men, scarcely the half escaped to the camps at Thermopylæ.

“But the transactions of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, at the same time, were as follow. There are two paths through the mountain Cæta: one of these, which is above Trachis,‡ is very craggy and steep; but the other, which is through Ænianæ, may be easily passed by foot soldiers: it was through this that the Mede Hydarnes once led his forces and came behind the Greeks that were commanded by Leonidas. They understood that the Heracleotæ and Ænianæ were leading Brennus through this path, not from any malevolence to the Greeks, but in consequence of being convinced that it would be a great undertaking if they could induce the Barbarians to leave their country before it was ruined. . . . Brennus, leaving Acichorius in his camps, and informing him that it would be proper for him to attack the enemy when he was certain that he (Brennus) was assaulting them behind with a chosen band of forty thousand men, marched through the mountain Cæta. It happened, however, on that day, that the mountain was covered with such a thick mist, that the sun was darkened; so that the Phocenses, who guarded that passage of the mountain, did not perceive the Barbarians till they were quite near them. Hence some began to engage the Gauls, and others strenuously sustained their attacks; but, being at length vanquished, they were compelled to abandon their post.” (Taylor’s ‘Pausanias,’ lib. x. ch. xxii.)

As in our own day, Moustai Pasha, the Vizier of Scodra,

\* Pausan., lib. x., cap. xxi.

† *Ib.*, lib. x., cap. xxii.

‡ In this the Gauls met with their repulse seven days after the action at Thermopylæ.

advanced with his Albanians from the depth of Thessaly towards the mountainous regions of Nevropolis and Carpenitza (or Callium), where the fate of Marco Botzaris was accomplished, so in antiquity 40,000 foot-soldiers and 800 Gallic cavalry, under the orders of Orestorius and Combutis, repassed the Sperchius, and threw themselves on Callium,\* in order to penetrate thence into Ætolia, where they were directed to destroy all by fire and sword, with the view of dividing the Grecian forces at Thermopylæ, by recalling to the defence of their own homes those soldiers whom Ætolia had furnished for service in this general war. We see, in reality, that the Ætolians immediately returned to their country, and that reinforced by Achæan troops which had left Patras, and inspired by the desire of vengeance, they destroyed half of the force under the lieutenants of Brennus, who, after receiving into his camp the troops brought back to him by these generals, forced, with 40,000 men, the defiles of Mount Cæta, his march being favoured by a thick fog.

The Greeks,† informed of this passage of the mountain, immediately abandoned the Pass of the Thermopylæ, and the Gauls overran the country beyond the great mountain-chain, that extends from the Velouchi to Mount Cæta.

We have constantly attached but little importance to the military reasonings of the author of the *Voyage et de l'Histoire de la Grèce* (Pouqueville); and it is certainly not solely with the intention of refuting his opinions that these observations are written; but as errors are apt to multiply when we set out from false premises, we are led by the preceding explanations to pay momentary attention to the following passage (translated) from the *Histoire de la Grèce*: "We follow Brennus, after the first check which he received at the Thermopylæ, across Bœotia, ascending the valley of the Cephissus, and attacking Trachiniæ, in order to enter the basin of the Sperchius. Being repulsed before that place, he meditated an invasion of Ætolia."

Now, after what has been stated, faithfully following Pausanias, who is as clear and precise in his narrative as can be desired, it is fully proved that Brennus had encamped in the valley of the Sperchius, and that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, and seven days afterwards at Trachiniæ, hindered him from crossing Mount Cæta, which divides Thessaly from Bœotia. How, then, is it possible that this general could have passed through Bœotia, ascended the Cephissus, which flows within that province, and attacked Trachiniæ in order to enter the valley of the Sperchius, out of which,

\* The Greek author does not state what route these generals took in their march on Callium, where two roads unite, one from Rentina, and the other from Patradgik. It is probable that the Gauls arrived by the latter road.

† Pausan., lib. x., cap. xxii.

it is clear, he had not yet moved, before making his expedition into Ætolia—a manœuvre the aim of which was to divide the Greeks encamped at the Thermopylæ? If, as asserted by the author (whose serious errors are here exposed), Brennus found himself in Bœotia, on the banks of the Cephissus, he must have *already* turned Mount Ceta and the Thermopylæ, and could, therefore, have attacked in the rear the Greeks who were still in the possession of this Pass, as the Persians had done long before, when it was defended by Leonidas. He would have had no need, then, for the attainment of this end, first to *invade* Ætolia.

All this portion of Greece has become invested with great interest in our day, as forming a part of the northern frontier of the Hellenic kingdom; it is, therefore, important to rectify whatever false notions may have gained currency respecting the ancient history of the country.

### 3. *Commentaries on the Battle of Marathon, (with Observations on Col. Leake's Map of Marathon, &c.).*


From the foot of Mount Stavrokoraki, which, belonging to the system of Parnes, forms the north-eastern limit of the valley through which the river of Marathona flows to the sea beyond the church of Panagia Mesosporitissa, is a distance of from 8000 to 9000 English feet, whilst the distance from the same church to the heights of Drakonera is almost twice as great. Between these points extends the great morass, in which, according to Pausanias,\* who gives a detailed description of the event, the greater part of the Persians were lost that perished in the celebrated battle of Marathon.

An army, inferior in numbers, and unprovided with cavalry, having to cover the great plain of Marathon, and consequently Athens itself, against the invasion of a superior force descending from the elevated plateau near Rhamnus, or from Mount Drakonera, would have the choice of several defensive combinations, by transferring the struggle to a theatre on which individual courage might make up for want of numbers, and where the cavalry of the enemy might be unable to act with advantage.

There are only two defiles which lead from the plain of Tricorythus toward the field where the battle with the Persians was fought—one at the foot of Mount Stavrokoraki, the other between the morass and the sea. Between them, during the dry season, there might probably be found some tortuous passages; but an army which, trusting to the deceitful appearance of these meadows, were to engage therein, would not fail to meet with serious

---

\* Pausanias, lib. i., cap. 32.



obstacles, on a ground dangerous in case of the slightest check or disorder.

The Greeks could not have chosen this field of battle. Uncertain as to the place where the enemy would disembark, they did not reach Marathon until after the descent of the Persians upon the plain.

However, (as Herodotus acknowledges,) the favourite battle-field of his countrymen was a plain, as being suitable to the deep order in which they were accustomed to fight, the principle of which was the phalanx, so inferior to the Roman legion, which in its turn could not be so efficient in tactics as the modern military organization, by means of which troops can pass with admirable precision from extended into deep order, and *vice versâ*. To cover the capital of Attica in the face of an enemy encamped on the plain of Marathon, the strategic point to occupy is the modern village of Vrana,\* at the bottom of the valley of the same name.

There are three roads which lead from the plain of Marathon to Athens, of which, (taking as the point of departure the great tumulus erected by the Greeks in memory of the heroes who fell in the engagement with the Persians)—that by Mount Pentelicus and the convent of Daoud, and that by Vrana and Stamata, are nearly equal in length; the road by way of Marathon and Stamata being the longest of all. According to the ancients, the distance from Marathon to Athens is 140 stadia. I have found, in accordance with Gell ('Itinerary'), that it is nearly a seven hours' journey from the tumulus to that city.

Vrana, in its strategic relations to the capital of Attica, is a central position. An army encamped in the valley commanded by that hamlet, menaces the flank of an enemy desirous of effecting a passage by either of the two other routes. It can compel the enemy either to give battle or to remain inactive.

History abounds with examples attesting by the results the danger of a flank-movement before an enemy in position, who detects the faults of his adversary.

Though the Greeks gained a victory over the Persians, who had deployed *all their forces* on level ground, they would have had a still better chance of success if, in eagerness to march on Athens, the Median generals, trusting to their superior numbers, had engaged *a part of their troops* in the defiles of Pentelicus or of Parnes, leaving the *rest* exposed to an isolated action, which the Greeks, in such an event, either turning off to the left of Vrana, or else descending towards the marshes on the right of the tumulus, would not have failed to bring about.

Almost all the modern authors who have written on the Battle

---

\* Vrana is on the site of the ancient Marathon. See subsequently the opinion of Colonel Leake.



of Marathon are obscure or incorrect\* in the details of that memorable event; and the extreme vagueness and inexactness of the ancient historians have naturally given rise to a chaos of opinions. It may be added, that the situation of the modern village of Marathona, in a valley separated from that of Vrana by the hill of Kotroni, has singularly contributed to confuse *non-military* travellers, who have been desirous to decide the question as to the positions held by the Greeks and by the Persians.

The opinions put forth in this dissertation, accompanied by a sketch of the movements on the field of battle, are in general altogether opposed to those which have been hitherto received; and should they not possess all the profundity desirable in historic researches, they have at least the merit of being the faithful reflection of convictions formed on the spot. The account of the battle of Marathon by Herodotus is as follows (lib. vi. cap. cxi., &c.) :—

cxI. . . . The Athenians were drawn out in the following order for the purpose of engaging :—The war-minister, Callimachus, commanded the right wing, for the law at that time was so settled amongst the Athenians, that the war-minister should have the right wing. He having this command, the tribes succeeded as they were usually reckoned, adjoining one another (without an interval between them), but the Plataeans were drawn out last of all, occupying the left wing. . . . At that time, when the Athenians were drawn out at Marathon, the following was the case : their line was equal in extent to the Median line, but the middle of it was but few deep, and there the line was weakest; but each wing was strong in numbers.

cxII. When they were thus drawn out, and the victims were favourable, thereupon the Athenians, as soon as they were ordered to charge, advanced against the barbarians in double quick time; and the space between them was not less than eight stadia.† But the Persians, seeing them charging at full speed, prepared to receive them; and they imputed madness to them, and that utterly destructive, when they saw that they were few in number, and that they rushed on at full speed, though they had no cavalry nor archers. So the barbarians surmised. The Athenians, however, when they engaged in close ranks with the barbarians, fought in a manner worthy of record. For they, the first of all the Greeks whom we know of, charged the enemy at full speed, and they first endured the sight of the Median garb, and the men that wore it; but until that time the very name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks.

cxIII. The battle at Marathon lasted a long time: and in the middle of the line, where the Persians themselves and the Sacæ were arrayed, the barbarians were victorious; in this part then the barbarians conquered, and having broken the line pursued to the interior, but in both wings the Athenians and the Plataeans were victorious; and having gained the victory, they allowed the defeated portion of the barbarians to flee; and having united both wings, they fought with those that had broken their centre, and the Athenians were vic-

---

\* The excellent work of Colonel Leake on the 'Demi of Attica,' lately published (when this was written), and in which are all the details desirable respecting the Battle of Marathon, was unknown to the author at the time of making these observations, which were in a great part dictated on the very field of the battle.

† In all probability Herodotus means the lesser stadium, the length of which is about 50 fathoms, and that he implies by this expression that they advanced not running, but at a quick marching pace.

torious. They then followed the Persians in their flight, cutting them to pieces, till, reaching the shore, they called for fire and attacked the ships.

cxiv. And in the first place, in this battle, the war-minister Callimachus was killed, having proved himself a brave man; and among the generals, Stesilaus, son of Thrasyllas, perished; and in the next place, Cynægeirus, son of Euphorion, having laid hold of a ship's poop, had his hand severed by an axe and fell; and, besides, many other distinguished Athenians were slain.

cxv. The Athenians made themselves masters of seven ships, but with the rest the barbarians rowing rapidly back, and after taking off the Eretrian slaves from the island where they had left them (*Ægilia*), sailed round Sunium, wishing to anticipate the Athenians in reaching the city. . . .

cxvi. They then sailed round Sunium. But the Athenians marched with all speed to the assistance of the city,\* and were beforehand in reaching it before the barbarians arrived; and having come from the precinct of Hercules at Marathon, they took up their station in another precinct of Hercules at Cynosarges: but the barbarians, having laid to with their fleet off Phalerum, for this was at that time the port of the Athenians, having anchored their ships there for a time, they sailed away for Asia.

cxvii. In this battle at Marathon there perished of the barbarians about 6400 men, and of the Athenians 192; so many fell on both sides.†—(*Herod.*, Bohn's *Transl.*, by H. Cary, M.A.)

Herodotus does not mention the number of the forces engaged on either side; but Pausanias‡ and Cornelius Nepos§ inform us that there were at Marathon 9000 Athenians (and the latter adds 1000 Platæans ||). The Persians had been transported into Greece, as Herodotus says, in 600 triremes, independently of the transports for the cavalry.¶

The breadth of the valley of Vrana, at its opening between the foot of Mount Pentelicus and the traces of the ancient road which

\* The Athenians left Aristides in command of one tribe at Marathon to guard the prisoners and the spoil. The other nine tribes marched to the relief of the city.

† The Rhetoricians were not backward in exaggerating the numbers of the slain, and inscriptions dictated by vanity or by flattery attested that the Persians had lost in the battle 200,000 men! (Suidas, tom. iii. p. 228.) . . . .

Justin (lib. ii. cap. ix. p. 94) writes that the loss of the Persians amounted to 200,000 men: "Ducenta millia Persæ eo prælio sine naufragio, amisère." I reproduce this passage, because Bernecceius appears not to have understood it. This commentator, wishing to make Justin agree with Herodotus, pretends that our historian alludes only to those who were killed on the field, whereas Justin comprises those also who perished at sea by shipwreck; and he cites Diodorus Siculus, lib. xi. sect. 12 and 13. The facts are that there was no shipwreck, that Diodorus treats in his eleventh book only of the Expedition of Xerxes, and that the tenth book, in which the battle of Marathon was described, is lost. *Shipwreck* in the passage of Justin must not be understood literally; it is but a figurative expression. (Notes sur Hérodote de M. Larcher (201), cxvii.; Erato, lib. vi. p. 463, edit. de Fan xi. (1802), Paris.)

‡ Pausanias, Messen. c. 29; Phocis, c. 20.

§ Cornelius Nepos in *Miltiade*.

|| Justin and C. Nepos say that there were 1000 Platæans. The former author counts the Athenians alone at 10,000 men. Plutarch (*Parallel. in Datis*) mentions only 9000 Athenians (Leake).

¶ Herodotus, liv. vi., cap. 99.

passes near the hill of Kotroni, is from 6000 to 6500 feet. About here, in my opinion, was formed the line of battle of the Athenians, who fortified their left flank with stockades (*abattis*).\*

Plutarch relates that the Greek centre was composed of the two tribes of Leontides and Antiochides, or of about 2000 men, under the command of Themistocles and Aristides,† which, allowing 2 feet of space in front for each man, and supposing them to be drawn up two ranks deep, would give a width of 2000 feet to the centre of their line of attack.

Four thousand men on each wing four ranks deep, would also occupy an extent of 2000 feet in front on either side, which, with the front of the centre, "there being no interval," makes a total extent of 6000 feet, or exactly the width of the opening of the valley of Vrana.

Herodotus expressly says, as we have just indicated, that the centre of the Greeks "was but *few deep* ; and there the line was weakest, but each wing was strong in numbers." The term *few deep*, however, is scarcely applicable to "two" ranks, the number of *two* ranks being too definite to warrant the expression "few deep ;" and if we take into account the custom of the Greeks not to fight except in an order of much greater depth,‡ and the habit also of their historians—even of Thucydides, the most exact of all—scarcely ever to state precisely, in their military details, the numbers of any but the *heavy-armed* troops, it seems very natural to suppose that the 10,000 men who (are recorded as having) fought at Marathon were all heavy-armed soldiers, and were accompanied by from 10,000 to 12,000 light-armed troops, who occupied the rear files ; so that the Greeks fought in columns four or five deep in the centre, and eight deep at the wings—proportions which correspond better than the numbers *two* and *four* with the terms in which the historian of Marathon treats of the weak and strong parts respectively of the Greek order of battle.

An examination of the Map will enable the reader to perceive that the general arrangement of the Greeks, as there indicated, is that which apparently Cornelius Nepos has intended to describe in the fifth chapter of his life of Miltiades. "Namque arboris multis locis erant stratæ, hoc consilio ut et montium tege-  
rentur altitudine, et arborum tractu equitatus hostium impedi-  
retur, re multitudine clauderentur."

\* Corn. Nepos in Miltiade, cap. v. There are still found some olive and other trees at the foot of the hill of Kotroni, and the environs of Zefire and of Bey were in all probability formerly covered with trees.

† Plutarch in Vit. Aristid., p. 321.

‡ During the Peloponnesian War, for example, at Oropus, the Thebans, on the right wing of the Bœotians, opposed to the Athenians, were drawn up 25 men deep, while the latter were only 8 deep.

If, as M. Kruse has suggested in his plan of the battle of Marathon, according to the data of modern travellers, the Greek front of attack extended from the foot of Pentelicus to the scarp sides of Mount Stavrokoraki, the stockade (*abattis*) in this position (so well defined and protected by the almost perpendicular declivities of the mountains, which on both sides rose on the flanks of the Greek line) must have been situated *in advance* of their line of battle, and would in such a case have singularly impeded the rapid advance of eight stadia, which the Greeks made for the purpose of attacking the enemy.

This suggestion, besides being of little consequence on account of the small importance which belongs to the *abattis*, becomes moreover utterly valueless if the distance be measured from the foot of Pentelicus to Stavrokoraki, which is nearly 15,000 feet. How can it be supposed that the Greeks occupied this space with 10,000 men, when, with only a *single* rank, it would have required 7500 men to furnish the front of battle? The right wing of the Greeks, moreover, must have been absolutely resting on Mount Pentelicus. The nature of the ground determines this position.

When advancing against the Persians, upon the most level ground in the whole plain (the bed of the rivulet or brook of Vrana being only about a foot beneath its surface), the left of the Greeks was their only vulnerable point so soon as they had passed the *abattis* (stockade) which covered this flank of their order of battle.

If, taking another view of the question, it were to be supposed that the Athenian army occupied the breadth of the valley of Marathona, properly so called, in front of the modern villages of Zefire and Bey, for the sole reason that this valley retains the name of Marathon, whilst the other now takes its name from the hamlet of Vrana, the Persian army ought also to be placed more to the right than it is in the accompanying plan, and on the other side of the river of Marathona. In this case the Greeks, advancing eight stadia from their first position, would have been weak on *both* flanks, both of them being equally without natural support; besides which, the course of the river of Marathona, which has a pretty deep bed, would have been a great obstacle to the advance in proper order of their left wing. Indeed, this wing would undoubtedly have been broken in the rapid movement projected by Miltiades.\* Whatever may be the military talent of a general, he will always prefer, if he have the choice, a ground favourable to the genius and the nature of the troops under his command.

Herodotus does not state what was the number of the Persians who fought at Marathon. He only informs us that "the Greek

---

\* Colonel Leake, by demonstrating that Vrana occupies the site of the ancient Marathon, has solved the question, but his 'Demi of Attica' had not been seen by the author when this was written.

line was equal in extent to the Median line," and that "the space between them was not less than eight stadia," which establishes the position of the Persian line as extending nearly from the lesser marsh, at the foot of Mount Pentelicus, in the direction of the tumulus, their line being prolonged considerably to the right of this latter point.

Thucydides, who, in several parts of his history, treats of the Persian war, and even incidentally of the battle of Marathon, makes no mention whatever of the numbers engaged; but at a later period Cornelius Nepos\* maintained that Datis had opposed to the Greeks 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse.† Such a force of cavalry could never have fought at Marathon. If we but consider the immense superiority of the modern marine, and the difficulties and expense in the transport of a single regiment of cavalry, entailed upon powers such as England and France, as well as the resources requisite for its embarkation, maintenance during the voyage, and subsequent disembarkation, there are strong grounds for doubting whether the Persians, under Datis and Artaphernes, could ever have embarked 10,000 cavalry horses. Much more reason is there to doubt the statements of the historians who make the whole army—the 10,000 cavalry inclusive—set out from the Aleian plain, in Ionia, and proceed from Ionia to Samos, then to Naxos to reduce the inhabitants to slavery, to Delos and Rhodus, and afterwards to all the other islands to levy troops (the cavalry and the 10,000 horses all this time going with the rest in their transports), and finally to Eretria and Marathon!

The following is the account given by Herodotus (lib. vi.) relative to the forces of the Persians in this invasion of Greece, and their means of transit:—

xcv. When the generals who were appointed left the king and reached the Aleian plain of Cilicia, bringing with them a numerous and well-equipped army, while they were there encamped—the whole naval force required from each people came up:‡ the horse transports were also present which Darius in the preceding year had commanded his tributaries to prepare. Having put the horses on board of these, and having embarked the land forces in the ships, they sailed for Ionia with six hundred triremes. From thence they did not steer their ships along the continent direct towards the Hellespont and Thrace, but parting from Samos, they directed their course across the Icarian Sea, and through the islands. . . . .

In lib. vii., treating of the invasion under Xerxes, he says—

CLXXXIV. As far as Thermopylæ the army had suffered no loss, and the numbers were at this time, as I find by calculations, of the following amount:—Of those in ships from Asia, amounting to 1207 originally, the whole num-

\* Corn. Nepos in Vit. Miltiad. cap. 5.

† Herodotus, lib. vi., cap. xciii. &c.

‡ These were only from the people of the maritime provinces, as appears from § xlviiii.

ber of the several nations was 241,400 men, allowing 200 to each ship; and on these ships thirty Persians, Medes, and Sacæ served as marines, in addition to the native crews of each: this further number amounts to 36,210. To this and the former number I add those that were on the penteconters (vessels of 50 oars), supposing eighty men on the average to be on board of each; but, as I have before said, 3000 of these vessels were assembled, therefore the men on board them must have been 240,000. This then was the naval force from Asia, the total being 517,610. Of infantry there were 1,700,000, and of cavalry 80,000: to these I add the Arabians who rode camels, and the Libyans who drove chariots, reckoning the number at 20,000 men. Accordingly the numbers on board the ships and on the land, added together, make up 2,317,610. This then is the force which, as has been mentioned, was assembled from Asia itself, exclusive of the servants that followed, and the provision ships, and the men that were on board them.

CLXXXV. But the force brought from Europe must still be added to this whole number that has been summed up; but it is necessary to speak by guess. Now the Grecians from Thrace, and the islands contiguous to Thrace, furnished 120 ships: these ships give an amount of 24,000 men. Of land forces which were furnished by Thracians, Pæonians, the Eordi, the Bottiæans, the Chalcidian race, Brygi, Pierians, Macedonians, Perrhæbi, Ænians, Dolopians, Magnesians, and Achæans, together with those who inhabit the maritime parts of Thrace; of these nations I suppose that there were 300,000 men: so that these myriads, added to those from Asia, make a total of 2,641,610 fighting men.

CLXXXVI. I think that the servants who followed them, and with those on board the provision-ships and other vessels that sailed with the fleet, were not fewer than the fighting men, but more numerous; but supposing them to be equal in number with the fighting men, they make up the former number of myriads. Thus Xerxes, son of Darius, led 5,283,220 men to Sepias and Thermopylæ.

CLXXXVII. This then was the number of the whole force of Xerxes. But of women who made bread, and concubines, and eunuchs, no one could mention the number with accuracy; nor of draught-cattle and other beasts of burden; nor of Indian dogs that followed, could any one mention the number, they were so many. Therefore, I am not astonished that the streams of some rivers failed, but rather it is a wonder to me how provisions held out for so many myriads. For I find by calculation, if each man had a chenix of wheat daily, and no more, 110,340 medimni \* must have been consumed every day; and I have not reckoned the food for the women, eunuchs, beasts of burden, and dogs. But of so many myriads of men, not one of them, for beauty and stature, was more entitled than Xerxes himself to possess this power.

In my opinion there were very few, if any, Persian cavalry present at the battle of Marathon, and the vessels of the maritime provinces (§ xlvi.) simply transported the horses of the officers and the beasts of burden, which have always abounded in Oriental armies from the days of Cyrus and Darius down to the present time. Although the expedition of Datis and Artaphernes cannot be compared in point of greatness and importance with

---

\* There were forty-eight chenices in a medimne. The 110,340 medimni presuppose an army of 5,286,320 men; but the army was less numerous by 13,100 men. There is then an error in the number either of the medimni or of the Persian troops. Wherever it may be is of little consequence. (Notes of Larcher to the Hist. of Herod. Polyhym., lib. vii. § 300.)



that of Xerxes, it is evident that the Persian monarch Xerxes experienced the difficulty of transporting cavalry by sea, because all troops of that arm who had left Asia for the second war in Greece went by land, the whole of the way to Athens. Besides, what would have become of the 10,000 cavalry in the *equal* extent of the two contending lines, one of which occupied only a front of from 6000 to 7000 feet? Would they have been placed *behind* their infantry to charge upon them instead of upon the enemy?

Or how was it that this cavalry (the first in the world of its time —“the cavalry of the warlike Persian nation, which, in order not to lose equestrian skill, scarcely ever went on foot”\*)—did not charge with its 10,000 horse and cut to pieces the unprotected flank of the Greek left wing, advancing *eight stadia*, or nearly a mile, over the most level plain of Attica? Lastly, after the defeat at Marathon, where, on the side of the Persians, only 6400 men were placed *hors de combat*, how did it happen that the cavalry should have managed to embark *during the rout*, in the twinkling of an eye, to follow the whole fleet, which, without tacking about shore (having retaken with them the slaves of Eretria), doubled Cape Sunium for the purpose of attacking Athens? If that cavalry could not effect an embarkation when routed, what became of the 10,000 horses; for no author asserts that they fell into the hands of the Greeks, who left Aristides on the field of battle in charge of the spoil † after the rest of the army had marched to Cynosarges to hinder the descent of the enemy elsewhere on the shores of Attica? ‡

The king Darius, besides, would hardly in the first instance have sent 10,000 cavalry against a small republic, on which he had only meditated making war, because the Persian queen, in a moment of caprice, had wished to be served by Greek slaves.§

These observations may generally apply to the estimates of numbers, which the ancient historians have made of so-called barbarian armies.

A great modern military genius, Napoleon Bonaparte, || who was concerned with affairs of the East, has decided the question by

\* See the Travels of Anacharsis the Younger.

† Plutarch in Vit. Aristid.

‡ See the opinion of the Rev. J. W. Blakesley, formed on philological grounds, in ‘Transactions of the Philological Society,’ 1854, January 13, No. I., pp. 1 to 10.

The jealousy which would have been excited at Athens by the truer view of the matter being insisted upon, may be guessed from the story told by Plutarch (Cimon, § 8). The sentiment of Sochares of Decelea: ὕταν μόνος ἀγωνισάμενος, ὦ Μιλτιάδην, νικήσῃς τοὺς βαρβάρους, τότε καὶ τιμᾶσθαι μόνος ἀξίον, was doubtless shared by all the ἄνδρες Μαραθωνομάχαι.

§ Travels of Anacharsis the Younger.

Mém. de Sainte Hélène.

showing the absurdity of statements received respecting the numerical forces of the armies of antiquity.\* In fact it is sufficient to consider the resources and the superiority of modern armies, and the difficulties entailed by the delays experienced by the marches of large bodies of troops through even the richest and most civilized districts, to be convinced of the impossibility of the progress of masses, such as the ancient historians treat of, through countries often barren and deserted. Almost all those historians exaggerate; but Herodotus, in this respect, leaves the rest far behind, for, if we credit him, Xerxes, in his great Median expedition, "led as far as Sepias and Thermopylæ 5,283,220 men," not taking into account the women employed in making bread, the concubines, eunuchs, Indian dogs, &c.

The authors who wrote subsequently to Herodotus have themselves recognised these exaggerations, and Ctesias limits the forces of Xerxes to "800,000 men, not reckoning the chariots." † Diodorus Siculus gives the same number, ‡ Ælian 700,000, § Pliny

\* Even now there is current in Arabia nearly the same exaggeration of the strength of the armies of Napoleon, as formerly existed amongst the nations of the East relative to those of the Persian king when he marched to the conquest of Greece. We might fancy we were again listening to the tales of Herodotus. Men in all ages love the marvellous.

“Abou'l Féroué ('the man in fur'), called also Bounaberdi. He came about thirty years ago into Egypt with an army more numerous than ants, and more terrible than locusts. The soldiers that he brought with him were reckoned at a thousand and one myriads, and it is said that he possessed the power of commanding the djinns or genii. It is, however, certain that he had found the ring of Solomon, by the aid of which he understood the language of birds, and could transport himself in an instant to distances greater than from the earth to the Pleiades. Every one knows that he was seen on the same day at Cairo and under the walls of Jaffa.

“Various accounts are given concerning the motives of his expedition to Egypt. If we believe the general and most probable rumour, he undertook the war there in order to carry off the mistress of a bey of the Mamelukes. She was, it is said, a Circassian woman of extraordinary beauty. Her face resembled the full moon, and her figure a *branche de bang*. She had a nose like the letter *l* (elif), eyebrows like two *o* (noun) reversed, and a small mouth like the letter *o* (mim): in a word, she could captivate this most redoubtable warrior with a cord made of one of the hairs of her tresses, and render him her slave for ever. Abou'l Féroué became desperately enamoured of this transcendent beauty on the account which a Copt had given him of her charms, and he resolved to obtain her at all hazards. He had offered for her to her possessor ten provinces and a hundred rich and populous cities; but the Mameluke positively refused the offer, saying that he would never give up a Moslem woman to a man who believed in God otherwise than as the disciple of Mahomet Ellébedi Fedj'alow Li' Uaki Sebjirikan.

“Then it was that Bounaberdi assembled a great army, with which he came to Egypt, to get possession of the beautiful Circassian. It is known that he vanquished the Mamelukes there, and pushed his conquests to the equator, and to the countries of Abyssinia and Soudan. But when he had obtained possession of her whom he adored, this woman convinced him that he followed a false religion; and Abou'l Féroué and all his army at once became Mussulmen.” (Tradition received from an Arab tribe on the shores of the Gulf of Suez. See Notes to the first Canto of the poem 'Napoléon en Egypte,' by MM. Méry and Barthélemy.)

† Ctesias in Persicis, § xxiii.

‡ Diod. Sic., lib. xi. § 3, tom. i.

§ Ælian. Histor. Var., lib. xiii. cap. 3. tom. ii.

788,000,\* Justin 1,000,000,† from all of which numbers we must make a liberal deduction. Voltaire was one of the first to hold up to ridicule these extravagant estimates. Cornelius Nepos, who naturally followed the Greek authors, deserves on this account no greater confidence than they themselves. His estimate of the Persian infantry at the battle of Marathon at 100,000 must be a notable exaggeration; for if such a number ever engaged there, or if bodies of troops at all approaching the numbers stated by Herodotus were ever transported into Greece, how could Thucydides, who may be esteemed more trustworthy, have maintained that the Peloponnesian war had been greater than all preceding it,‡—itself truly a contest of dwarfs (in comparison with the wars of our times), in which the greatest force displayed by the Athenians amounted to only 13,000 heavy armed men,§ and in which we find the Lacedemonians on two occasions suing for peace, in order not to lose 420 *soldiers* besieged in the isle of Sphacteria? ||

Herodotus indicates the number of the vessels which transported the Persian army to Marathon; and it may be said that Cornelius Nepos and the rest have been governed in their estimates by this number; but it is precisely the number mentioned that must be put in question, because the historian (Herodotus) knew how many men each vessel could contain, and he would not have recorded a falsehood easy of detection by a simple calculation. But supposing Herodotus ever so desirous of stating the truth, how could he have been able to ascertain it fifty or sixty years after the battle of Marathon (the epoch at which he composed his history), when we consider that in our own days, possessing, as we do, so many means unknown to the ancients for determining facts, it is necessary, in order to arrive at the truth, to scrutinise so many and often contradictory opinions? Thus, for instance, five or six years only after the siege of Missolonghi, an event of our own day, it was asserted, and with such pertinacity as almost to enforce belief, that 100,000 Turks ¶ had laid siege to

\* Plin. Hist. Natur., lib. xxxiii. cap. 10, tom. ii.

† Justin, Histor., lib. ii. cap. x. Notes de Larcher, Trad. d'Hérodote.

‡ Thucyd. Hist., lib. x.

§ Ibid. lib. ii.

|| Ibid. lib. iv.

¶ The author, in the interest of history, cannot refrain from opposing to the assertion "that the heroic garrison of Missolonghi defended itself against an army of 100,000 *barbarians*, commanded by *European officers*," the evidence afforded by the official reports of European agents who were eye-witnesses of the facts.

The investment of Missolonghi,<sup>a</sup> which town was defended by a weak line of intrenchments and 15 small pieces of artillery—three to twelve pounders—was effected by a body of 20,000 men under the orders of Reschid Mehemet Pasha, of which number only from 7000 to 8000 were soldiers in the pay of the Sultan:

<sup>a</sup> Green, Sketches of the War in Greece, Letter XLII., May 1825, and Letter XLV.

that place, whereas at no period were there more than 15,000 combatants in the united armies of Reschid and Ibrahim Pashas—

the rest, although all armed, and capable of repulsing a sortie, were composed of adventurers hoping for pillage, merchants, and that enormous train which follows the eastern hordes of war. All the latter were utterly useless for the real operations of a siege, conducted even in the Turkish fashion.

It is very difficult, unless by actual ocular examination, to gain an approximation to the truth with reference to the numerical force of the Sultan's armies. The generals of brigades are interested in deceiving their pashas, the pashas the grand vizier, and the latter the Sultan himself. If the reader, also, reflects that the Greeks, to enhance their exploits, naturally overstate the numbers of the enemy, he may form some idea of the obstacles that authors encounter in endeavours to be exact in their estimates.

The Greek garrison of Missolonghi, that is the men capable of bearing arms, never were more than 5000 soldiers. In engineering, it is reckoned that a regular fortress defended by good troops, demands for its attack a force five times more numerous than the garrison.<sup>b</sup> On this estimate the army of the Seraskier ought to have consisted of 25,000 men; and it contained 8000 combatants. Nevertheless it was a glorious act for the Greeks to have resisted even this number, diminished as they were by misery, and sheltered only by a bad wall and a narrow ditch a few feet deep. It is true that the Turkish artillery<sup>c</sup> was miserably served; it was worse than that of the Egyptians, which arrived later, and which yet, after a cannonade of fifteen days, with large pieces, had not succeeded in making a practicable breach.<sup>d</sup>

It should be added that several of the Albanian chiefs, having an interest in prolonging a war which was to them a source of profit, had a secret understanding with the besieged Greeks.

The vigour with which Reschid Pasha urged the operations against the place made these troops desert *en masse*, to such an extent that the vizier saw his army reduced to 3000 combatants, when Ibrahim and his Arabs, to the number of 11,000 or 12,000 (effective) troops, appeared at the siege, which terminated by the sortie of April 22nd, 1826, the last valorous achievement of the defenders of Missolonghi.

The effective force of the two Turkish divisions never, therefore, exceeded 15,000 men at the same time before the place; and such was the misunderstanding that prevailed between the Egyptians and the Albanians, that the former, after having taken the town, fired upon the latter to prevent them from entering to pillage it,<sup>e</sup> convinced as they were of the treachery of most of the Epirote chiefs.<sup>f</sup>

The Arabs lost from 2000 to 2500 men at this siege, most of them in the insensate attack on the little church upon the islet of Clissova, which was an absurd affair, prompted by vanity and rivalry between the Turkish and Egyptian commanders. Ibrahim led back 9000 men into the Morea.

The obstinacy of Reschid Pasha, who required the surrender of Missolonghi *at discretion*, prolonged the siege; but the Greeks subsequently refused the capitulation which Ibrahim offered to them on April 21st, on terms similar to those at Anatolic, which were scrupulously observed by the Turks.

The prolongation of the defence of Missolonghi must be attributed as much to the brave conduct of the garrison as to the ignorance of the Turks in the art of conducting sieges and the treachery of the Albanian chiefs. One or two European regiments would have attacked and carried the town at the point of the bayonet,

<sup>b</sup> Napoleon, Mém. Camp. d'Italie, Siège de Mantoue.

<sup>c</sup> The artillery with the "army of investment" of Reschid Pasha (Gordon, Hist. of Greece) consisted of ONE howitzer. Subsequently pieces of ordnance of different calibres were brought from Lepanto.

<sup>d</sup> Green, Sketches, Letter L.

<sup>e</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>f</sup> The Egyptians had proofs of this after the capture of the town. During the siege under Ibrahim, the Albanians were never employed except at the advanced posts, and not in the duties of the attack.—Green, *ibid.*

so true is it that men always exalt the present danger, and when it has gone by, still more exaggerate the past.

It will, I think, as to the troops of the king of Persia which fought at Marathon, be pretty near the truth if we estimate the cavalry as of very slight amount, and the infantry, both heavy and light, at the very most, at half of the numbers of Cornelius Nepos; that is at 40,000 or 50,000 "fighting" men, which is double the force allowed to the Athenians.\*

Although it was not habitual to the Persians to fight in deep ranks, the circumstances would appear to have induced them to deviate from their general rule at the battle of Marathon, so soon as their leaders had resolved not to form detachments for acting against the weak points of the Greek order of battle. It certainly is wrong in action unless in special exceptional cases, to operate, *if the forces are equal*, with small detachments on the flanks or rear of the enemy; but this rule is not applicable to the

---

probably without firing a cannon shot at its insignificant ramparts.<sup>5</sup> Singly considered, the defence was a brilliant achievement; but it will not bear comparison with the resistance of Saragossa, nor even with that of the great redoubt at the Moskowa, where the cavalry charged when the ditches were literally filled with assailants who had fallen under the fire of the Russians.

I will add one last observation concerning the *European officers*, whom M. Rizo alleged to have commanded the "army of a hundred thousand barbarians." It is an extract from a letter by Mr. Green, whose work, violently decried in a time of political excitement, has at length been acknowledged to contain a great deal of truth. As to his observations on the siege of Missolonghi, I have been able to confirm almost all of them by impartial researches. "Of the European officers, of whom so much has been said, there are few of any consequence with Ibrahim. Of the French the generality are surgeons, young students from the hospitals; Colonel Sèves, known as Soliman Bey, is now at Tripolizza, and has not been here. The Italians are chiefly instructori or drill-officers, but they have merely the name, at least while they remained here; it is said, however, that they were of use in Egypt. The number of Europeans now here (at Patras), and at Missolonghi with the army, does not exceed thirty; and I am informed that there are not more than double that number altogether in the Morea. Ibrahim Pasha is said to pay little attention to them, and in no instance, I believe, followed their advice, not even that of his chief engineer, Lieut.-Colonel Romey, a Neapolitan."

\* One of the reasons of Datis, the Persian general, for accepting battle was his desire to fight before the arrival of the Lacedæmonians (C. Nepos in Miltiadi., cap. v.), who by extraordinary forced marches reached Marathon some days after the victory of the Athenians, having accomplished 1140 stadia, or 140½ English miles, from Sparta to the neighbourhood of Athens, in the course of three days! The most remarkable forced march in modern times was executed by the British in Spain, who after a journey of 20 miles, marched 62 more from Malpartida de Plasencia to Talavera in 26 hours, each man having to carry a weight of from 50 to 60 lbs. It was Lieutenant-General Crawford's brigade, consisting of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments, which effected this march on July 30th, 1809. (Napier's Hist. of the Peninsular War, vol. ii., book 9, c. 2.)

---

<sup>5</sup> General Laudon, in the campaign of 1760, carried by a general attack of his troops the regularly fortified place of Schweidnitz, defended by 3900 Prussians. The Austrians scaled the forts and walls in open day, and made themselves masters of the town after four hours' fighting. General Laudon's order of the day ran, "The attack will be made in four columns, with the bayonet, without firing a musket." Jomini, *Traité des Gr. Opérations Militaires*.

Persians at Marathon, where they were evidently far superior in numbers, and much less would it apply if they were provided with cavalry. It is necessary, however, to have served in or against Oriental armies, which have been almost stationary in their usages from the time of the Persian Empire down to our own day, to form any conception of the supineness and want of foresight which ordinarily characterise their proceedings.

A deep order might have given to the battle front of the Persians an extent about equal to that of the Greek line, if the former were posted between the marsh near the supposed site of the temple of Minerva Hellotis, and the river of Marathon.

It may be conceived that the Persian right, flying towards the ships and Cape Cynosura, suffered considerable loss by getting entangled in the great morass, where many were overwhelmed and destroyed\* in the general disorder. The Persian left, in like manner, routed by the brigade of Callimachus, was completely broken on the uncertain and marshy ground into which the Greeks had thrown them. The defile between Pentelicus and the lesser marsh is very narrow (from 350 to 300 paces in width). On the retrograde movement of the right wing of the Greeks (after the victory of their wings) to succour their centre, it is probable that a part of their light troops occupied this defile, where the superior numbers of the enemy becoming ineffective, the light troops hindered the return of the Persians to the field of battle. It may also be believed that at the left wing of the Greeks a part of the light troops continued to menace the Persians in their flight, whilst the bulk of the wings, retracing their steps, decided the defeat of the Persian centre, the broken masses of which fled towards their vessels, which were so near the land that the Greeks captured several ships. This disposition, as regards a part of the light troops, appears probable, if it be considered that at the time when it took place the loss of the Persians—which in all did not exceed 6400 men—had not been very considerable, their centre being as yet victorious.

The greater part of the Persian fleet appears to have been drawn up, on the day of the battle, along the Bay of Marathon, to beyond the supposed site of the temple of Minerva Hellotis. The vessels being very near the land, as their build allowed, the troops were enabled easily to retire to them during and after the rout, which explains also why the Greeks “called for fire” to burn them. Their proper and safe anchorage must have been inside of Cape Cynosura, where the fleet was sheltered from eastern, north-eastern, and other winds, which prevail in those seas towards the end of summer, and often blow with great violence. The battle of Marathon took place at this season, about the 17th of August B.C. 490, according

---

\* Pausanias, lib. i., cap. 32.

to M. Freret,\* or about the 29th of September, according to the author of the "Voyage du jeune Anacharsis."† The same winds destroyed on the shores of Magnesia a great part of the fleet of Xerxes; for it "was shipwrecked by a furious tempest with a strong easterly wind, which the inhabitants of the neighbouring coasts call Hellespontines."‡ They were evidently winds from the N.E. or E.N.E.§

If the strategic merits of the disposition of the Greeks at Marathon be examined, it will be observed that they fought there in one comparatively thin and extended line, and nevertheless without a reserve. Here was an absence of the true principles of military art, unless it be supposed that Miltiades intimidated his enemies by the novelty, promptitude, and boldness of his manœuvres. It has never occurred to any one to admire the tactics of General Cuesta (always reckoned a general of very poor capacity) against Marshal Victor at the battle of Medellin. The Spaniards then, like the Greeks, fought in a single line *without reserve*; like the conquerors of the Persians, they advanced on the enemy at charging pace, traversing a considerable distance, the troops of Cuesta having the further advantage of outflanking considerably the left wing of the French. Marshal Victor, as soon as he had obliged the Spanish general to show his line of battle, changed his dispositions, both offensive and defensive, on the discovery of a total want of reserve on the part of the enemy, and owed a brilliant victory to this fault of Cuesta, which the latter could not repair, even by an imposing and rapid offensive movement of the whole Spanish line. ||

The proportion between the forces of the Greeks and of the Persians at Marathon was nearly the same as that between the Prussians and the army of the Prince de Soubise at Rosbach; ¶ but the Athenians obtained their victory, glorious though it was, only by a boldness approaching to rashness, and through the irresolution of the Persian troops on the wings of their line, which fled after a check attended with little bloodshed, without returning to the charge, when they saw the retrograde movement of the Greeks; whereas the soldiers of Frederick the Great covered themselves with greater glory by their coolness and courage, guided by the consummate skill of the greatest captain of his time.

\* Toward the 6th Metageiton, Freret, *Mém. de l'Acad. de Belles Lettres*, tom. xviii.

† Toward the 6th Boëdromion, 3rd year of the 72nd Olympiad. *Voyage du Jeune Anacharsis*.

‡ Herodotus, lib. vii., cap. 188.

§ Notes of Larcher, transl. of Herodotus.

|| See the detailed description of the battle of Medellin and the observations of Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, vol. ii., lib. viii., cap. 3, 4.

¶ The King of Prussia 22,000 men; the Prince de Soubise 50,000 men.

Lastly the disproportion between the forces of attack and of defence in the wars of the English in India against their native enemies was always much more considerable than the difference which existed between the numbers of the contending forces at Marathon. [The opinion of Mr. Hobhouse ('Travels in Albania') is very similar to that advanced in these Commentaries.—*March, 1839.*]

*Observations on Colonel Leake's Map of Marathon, &c.*

COLONEL LEAKE, by determining the site of the ancient Marathon as being that of the modern village of Vrana, has solved the essential point of the military question. In fact, the opinions put forth in the preceding dissertation, which was written before the author had any knowledge of the profound researches of the celebrated English geographer, have derived from these latter the strongest confirmation. The principal object to be ascertained was whether the right wing of the *Greek line of battle* had rested or not on the chain of rocks that runs from Vrana toward the sea; and the weighty authority of the author of the '*Demi of Attica*' places this fact beyond doubt. The question of the greater or less extent of the line toward the left is of secondary consideration; it depends on the depth of the order of battle in which the Greeks fought; and we think that in this respect we ought to persist as to the probable correctness of the observations already advanced.

In the opinion of Colonel Leake the Greek wings were only three men deep, and the centre two deep; the whole line being reinforced by the light troops, estimated at 10,000 men—that is, the same number as the *hoplitæ* or heavy-armed troops. In that case, however, to have a battle-front of nearly 12,000 feet in extent (from the foot of Mount Pentelicus to the river of Marathon, calculating two feet of space for each man), it must be admitted that Miltiades allowed "more" than two feet of space per man for those in the centre\* (an arrangement which, considering that there were but two ranks of heavy-armed soldiers in this part of the line, too greatly weakened its strength). Moreover this disposition of the forces cannot be reconciled with the expression of Herodotus, who says "that the Athenians having actually engaged the Barbarians, their *closed* ranks performed memorable actions;" also, "that their wings were numerous and strong."

The left wing of the Greeks, supported though it was by the *abattis* at the foot of the hill of Kotroni, as we have supposed, or by other defences on the banks of the river of Marathon, was always, as the Colonel admits, the weak point, from the moment

---

\* Leake, *Demi of Attica*.



that the offensive movement of the Greeks took place. The river of Marathona, although much deeper than the course of the rivulet of Vrana, was not nearly enough so to protect this left wing, which, in our general disposition of the two armies, as in that of the English author, is considerably outflanked by the right wing of the Persian army.

The first position of the Greeks, as we have sketched it, is even stronger than that extending as far as the river, which offers no obstacle to an offensive movement on the part of the Persians.

The Colonel estimates the force of the army of Datis and Artaphernes on the day of the battle at 26,800 regular infantry, and 6,000 cavalry: and he reckons the complete armament of the Persians at 177,000 men, the crews of the ships of war and the transports all being included.\* Our own opinion as to the strength of the cavalry and its inaction (so improbable when opposed to infantry advancing over a plain) is already known; and it appears to us, for the reasons stated, as difficult to believe in the transport and long sea-voyage of 6,000 as of 10,000 horse. On this account, the estimate of the learned archæologist must, in our opinion, be subjected to considerable reduction in all its proportions; especially as we think that the number of triremes may be materially diminished. At the very most 100,000 men—regulars, light troops, sailors, retinues, and servants all comprised—seems to be the highest possible estimate; and that of 40,000 or 50,000 *fighting* men on land as the most probable at the battle of Marathon; for we repeat, it is precisely the number of the vessels indicated by Herodotus that we mistrust.

If, in reality, such immense masses had been acting against the Greeks, as Herodotus alleges in his description of the Median war, how could the more exact and trustworthy Thucydides have justly maintained that the Peloponnesian war had been *greater* than all the preceding wars? He says, “It will be seen by the circumstances that the war which I am describing (the Peloponnesian) is the greatest that Greece ever had.”—*Thucyd. Hist.*, lib. i. And again,

---

\* Colonel Leake's estimate of the Persian armament is as follows:—

Regular infantry, 50 men in each one of 600 triremes	..	30,000
Cavalry	.. .. .	7,000
Rowers of 600 triremes, serving as archers on land	.. ..	90,000
A portion of the crews of the cavalry transports, serving on land as light troops	.. .. .	10,000
The remainder of the crews of cavalry transports	.. ..	10,000
Sailors on board of the triremes	.. .. .	30,000

177,000

But making deduction of at least one-tenth for deficiency of complement, desertion, sickness, accidents by sea, horses disabled, and garrisons at Naxos, Eretria, &c., the Colonel sets down the Persians on the day of the battle at 26,800 regular infantry and 6000 cavalry.

“ Besides, the *greatest* of all the preceding wars, which is that against the Persians, was decided by two engagements at sea, and two on land.”—*Ibid.* The Athenians, however, as we have already taken occasion to remark, had never in this “*great war*” (the Peloponnesian) more than 13,000 hoplitæ (*Thucyd.* lib. ii.), “ of whom 10,000 were citizens, and 3000 other inhabitants, not counting the light infantry, which was not in small number.”

If Thucydides had believed in the astonishing force of the Persian armaments, he would assuredly have spoken of it to heighten the heroism of his countrymen; but he studiously passes in silence the subject of their numbers on every occasion on which he refers to the war with the Medes. Nay, on the contrary, he expressly remarks, as a very clear acknowledgment of the habitual exaggerations of historians—“ So little curious are we to investigate the truth, and so easily content to suffer ourselves to be led by common fame. We shall not be mistaken, however, in adopting the arguments I have alleged, without crediting the fictions of the poets, or the falsehoods of the historians, whose main object is to tickle the ears rather than to tell the truth, and who advance statements without proofs, which do not fail to gain credit by degrees in the minds of people, though they be but fables.”—*Thucyd. Hist.*, lib. i. This was, indeed, a very bad compliment to Herodotus; and if Thucydides has not further exposed the exaggerations of that writer, it is only because his patriotic feeling as an Athenian was too much interested to permit him to do so, for he would thereby have inflicted a serious blow on the glory of his country.

*Observations on the Map of Kruse.*

The perusal of the dissertation on the battle of Marathon, and of the notes on the opinions of Colonel Leake, may be sufficient to convince the reader of the inexactness of the map of Kruse, and especially of its military dispositions.

*First.* The extent of the lines of battle is altogether disproportionate to that of the forces which were engaged in the action at Marathon. We know not where M. Kruse acquired the idea of his subdivisions of the Persian line into Medes, Sacæ, Persians, and irregular troops. It is a mere figment of the imagination; for such a subdivision is not mentioned by any ancient author as having existed on the day of the action.

*Secondly.* The tumulus of the Greeks is placed much too far from the sea. The opinion of Colonel Leake is, that this tumulus was erected on the spot where the greater number of the Athenians fell, or where the two centres encountered each other, at the first attack of the Athenians. We will add, that on our map this tumulus has been placed exactly opposite the centre of the Greek line, a circumstance which appears worthy of remark, on account of the tendency to symmetry which so generally characterises the public monuments of the ancients, and their appendages.

The church of Panagia Mesosporitissa is not indicated in the map of Kruse. It was there, however, that Mr. W. Bankes found the remains of a single Ionic column, 2½ feet in diameter, which, according to Colonel Leake, perhaps formed a part of the trophy of *white marble* erected by the Athenians

after the action, and which appears to have existed in the time of Pausanias. The church stands on the very spot where the great massacre of the Persian centre must (probably) have taken place, and where the victory of the Athenians was completed when they drove their enemies back to the shore and into the great morass.

*Thirdly.* The researches of Colonel Leake prove that the Grotto of Pan cannot be placed, as has been done by M. Kruse, near Inõe, the locality wrongly occupied by the ancient Marathon in the German map. It is on or near Mount Stavrokoraki that this grotto must be sought for. Meanwhile the English archaeologist believes that he has found traces of the stables of Artaphernes\* at a cavern on Mount Drakonera, the head-quarters of the Persians having been, at least during the first days,† to all appearance, and according to all military rules, on the elevated plain of Tricorythus. M. Kruse then is in error in placing the tent and the stables of Artaphernes close to the site of the Temple of Minerva Hellotis.

#### 4. *Commentaries on the Battle of Sellasia, and the Strategic Movements of the Generals of Antiquity between Tegea, Carya, and Sparta.*

##### SECT. A. *Researches on the Site of Sellasia.*

Researches upon the hitherto unrecognized site of Sellasia have occupied many authors. Those who have desired at the same time to resolve the military question and to determine the position of Mounts Olympus and Eva have put forward only conjectures; especially M. de Beaujour (*Voyage Militaire de la Turquie*), who appears to have consulted the French map of the Morea before its publication, and Colonel Leake, who has thought that he could identify the Monastery of 'Aghios Seranda as erected on the site of the ancient Sellasia. In such a case, the Tzinzina river ought to be the Cenus, and the rivulet of Bassara, the Gorgilos—as is admitted by the celebrated English archaeologist.

Prepossessed with the idea of the great anti-strategic détour, which, in this case, Antigonus must have compelled his army to make in its advance from Argos toward Laconia, I ascended the valley of the Cenus, or Kéléfina, from its mouth up to beyond the khan of Krévata, on the route to Vresthéna.

Struck with the natural strength of the position of Krévata, and its strategic importance, I sought for the site of Sellasia in its environs. The ruins indicated on the French map as the remains of this fortress appeared to me too insignificant. The entire surface of the small cone where the traces of an ancient fort appear, is only about 6000 or 7000 square mètres (7180 to 8370 sq. yds.). This is the eminence now known under the common designation of Palæogoula (old fort). Extending my examination to the elevated

\* Pausanias, *Descrip.*, lib. i., cap. 32.

† Of the week or nine days during which the armies remained in sight of each other.—G. S. B.



PROVATA MOUNTS  
(MOUNTOYMPUS)

ELENGERARA MOUNTAINS  
Kelefina R. (Gnus)

Road from Argos

Road from Tegea  
Great Road

Ruins of an ancient Fort

Khan of Krevata

Ancient Ruins

XI

XII

XIII

XIV

XV

VII

VIII

XVI

TOURKIA MOUNTAINS

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v

w

x

y

z

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

j

k

l

m

n

o

p

q

r

s

t

u

v


w

x

y

z





Reference.

- The Lacedaemonian Army in order of Battle
- The Right Wing under Cleomenes (Phalaris) a.s.a.

- Camp of Antigonus Dion.
- The Macedonian Army in order of attack.

Right Wing.

- b The Illyrians in ambuscade in the gorges
- c The Macedonians with bronze bucklers & the Achaeanians &c. c. 3000 Achaean f. 2000 Achaean in reserve.

Centre.

- g 1000 Megalopolitans h. 1000 Achaean
- i Cavalry of Antigonus, of which k is a Corps under Philipposon.

Left Wing.

- l The double Macedonian Phalanx formed two deep
- m. 5000 Men. of the Light Troops.
- n The Right Wing of the Macedonians (after the movement of the Illyrians & Achaeanians by m. n. m. & n. n. n.) at the moment of the attack.
- o The Light Infantry (a.) of Evastides taking the Achaean in flank & rear.

- Isolated Charge of Philipposon for defeating the offensive movement of the Light Infantry, a. I to XX. Points determined by Triangulation.
- Visible remains of Fortification.

# PLAN OF SELLASIA & Military Sketch of the ENVIRONS & the FIELD OF BATTLE.

Scale of 1000 Yards

100 200 300 400 500 1000  
Exp. by Edw. Waller.

plateau of the mountain of 'Aghios Constantinos (Mount St. Constantine), my doubts gave way to a conviction that the site of Sellasia was there irrevocably fixed.

The accompanying map presents the exact plan of that celebrated fortress. Throughout a circumference of 1100 mètres (1203 yds.) of city walls, and of 630 mètres (689 yds.) of those of the Acropolis, I discovered the foundations, perfectly recognisable, of 11 towers, having each 10 mètres frontage, by 8 mètres in flank, and of one tower at the south-west extremity of the city, the proportions of which were 12 and 10 mètres. Near to the latter two entrances may be seen; those which are probably to be found in other places did not appear to me to be sufficiently recognisable to be marked on the Plan.

The walls, which are of the second period of Hellenic constructions, present almost in every part two layers of hewn stones, uniformly  $3\frac{1}{2}$  mètres in width, or nearly 11 feet English. The hand of man, more even than time, has caused the disappearance of the enormous masses of wrought stone, which ought otherwise to have been found here: it is, therefore, not surprising that Colonel Leake should have seen at the convent of 'Aghios Seranda (two hours to the south-east) inscriptions having reference to Sellasia.

The dull sound of subterranean waters is heard distinctly at two places indicated on the Plan of Sellasia, where there are artificial caverns; their communication with the excellent and abundant springs at the church of 'Aghios Janis, at the foot of the rock of 'Aghios Constantinos, is highly probable.

The ancient highway from Tegea to Sparta, passing beneath Sellasia, turns to the south near Palæogoula, where it runs for a short distance in a west-south-westerly direction; it leads by Vou-tiani to the ancient bridge over the Eurotas, descends from this village into a narrow valley, and is commonly from 20 to 30 mètres in width, down to the banks of the Kéléfina (Cenus). Another route by Kurti lies also along the slope of the mountain. The present road from Tripolitza to Mistra proceeds from Palæogoula direct to the bridge of Kopano, past the khan of Vourlia. Here are to be found at intervals portions of a highway dating from the middle ages.

#### SECT. B. *Strategic Importance of the Position of Mounts Eva and Olympus.*

The position of Sellasia having been ascertained, the isolated mounts of Tourlis and Provata naturally present themselves as the Eva and Olympus of the ancients.

The Gorgilos is identified, at the foot of Mount Eva, as the stream which falls into the Cenus, at 250 mètres (273 yds.) south-

eastward of the khan of Krévata. Inconsiderable as it is, it deserves to be distinguished from the other small tributaries of the Œnus, inasmuch as it is the only one which has water in summer derived from a spring.

Cleomenes might here have awaited the King of Macedon, who was advancing from Argos towards Laconia by one of the two principal routes—that of Tegea, or that which passes by (the modern) Arakhova, whither by the latter mentioned route he directed his march by the Mills and Kastri, or by Astros and 'Aghios Janis. The two first-mentioned highways bifurcate at the khan of Krévata; and the enemy could there be stopped in the excellent position of Mounts Eva and Olympus, which were indeed occupied by Cleomenes—who, however, as an able captain, caused the other openings into Laconia to be guarded by small detachments (*Polybius*, lib. ii.) in order to guard against a surprise. From his position, encamped (*à cheval*) on ridges commanding the two principal routes of communication, it was easy for him, at any point, to forestall his adversary, who operated upon the arc of a circle, one of the chords of which was occupied by the Spartan army. Antigonus, therefore, without wasting time in incoherent movements, which could only have imposed upon him useless or dangerous marches and countermarches, advanced directly upon Cleomenes, and encamped in the face of the Spartans, his front being covered by the Gorgilos, and his left flank extending toward the Œnus. Polybius does not state by what route the Macedonians advanced; but he leads us to suppose it was by that of Tegea.

Different narratives have been left by that historian and by Plutarch, of the memorable event which decided the fate of Sparta upon the heights of Sellasia. (*See Polybius and Plutarch.\**)

Before entering into further details, it is necessary here to offer some observations on the text of Polybius.

*Firstly*, as to the distribution of the forces. Antigonus had 28,000 foot and 1200 horse. To these Cleomenes opposed 20,000 men in all, disposed in defensive order on the Mounts Eva and Olympus. Polybius is not altogether clear as to the number of the Macedonian troops which encountered the Spartans upon each of these heights; but on collating Plutarch's account with his own, it would appear that Antigonus took with him the Macedonians, of whom Polybius reckons 13,000, but from which number must be deducted those armed with bronze bucklers, so that we may count 12,000 combatants as having accompanied the king, besides 5000 light troops, amongst which must be enumerated the Agrians and the Gauls, who are to be considered *par excellence*

\* Polyb. Hist., lib. ii. cap. v.; Plut. in Vit. Philopoem.; do. in Vit. Cleom.

as Macedonian mercenaries. There remain, consequently, after deducting the cavalry and the 2000 foot who fought along with them, 8600 men for the attack upon Mount Eva. But Polybius mentions only the Illyrians, 1600 strong; the Acarnanians (rather Epirotes) and Cretans, 2000; the Achaians in reserve, 2000; then the bronze-bucklered Macedonians, without indicating their number; and, finally, he nowhere accounts for 3000 mercenaries or allies, who are wanting to complete the number, and who evidently must have combated on Mount Eva. We have included these 3000 men in the Achaian troops.

*Secondly*, the order of attack is not very clear, especially as regards the disposition of the forces on Mount Eva. Nevertheless, on comparing the two Greek authors, it is evident that the Illyrians and bronze-bucklered Macedonians were at the extreme right; that after them came the Acarnanians and Cretans; and then the Achaians in reserve. The translators of Polybius (Hampton) and Don Vincent Thuillier (Folard), have incorrectly rendered the Greek text in translating ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς Ἀκαρνανῶνας καὶ Κρητῆτας ἐπέβαλε· τούτων δὲ κατόπιον ἦσαν δισχιλίοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐφεδρείας λαμβάνοντες τάξιν (Polyb., Cas. 1670, B. 2, pp. 210, 211), by "the *second line* was composed of the Acarnanians and Cretans, followed by 2000 Achaians as a body of reserve." If we read Polybius on the spot, we shall readily conceive how, as a military man, it would not be possible to speak of a *second line*, since the nature of the ground would not admit of such a disposition; whilst the Greek passage thus literally translated, "After these (that is to say, the Illyrians and the bronze-bucklered Macedonians) came the Acarnanians and Cretans, followed by 2000 Achaians as a body of reserve," describes precisely a disposition such as the locality renders possible, and as has been traced on our plan of the battle of Sellasia.

*Thirdly*, there are two principal movements indicated on this plan: that of the Illyrians turning the left of Euclides, whilst the Macedonians of the right wing attack it in front, and are in turn taken in flank and rear by some light Spartan troops; and then the charge of Philopœmen to check this latter diversion.

Only the first of these movements is noticed by Polybius; but Plutarch *positively* states that the wing of Euclides *was turned*. The second movement is represented by the historian (Polybius) as a cavalry fight; but we are more inclined to follow the details of Plutarch, because it is probable that Philopœmen had drawn with him all his countrymen. Besides, a combined attack of cavalry and infantry against the light troops of Euclides, who had taken the Achaians in flank, would lead more surely to the object in view. Philopœmen, having the means for making such an



attack, would certainly not have charged with some platoons of horse alone.

We pass now to the general action.

SECT. C. *Order of Battle of the Lacedæmonian General.*

Cleomenes, having 20,000 men, took with him 5000 light troops and the Spartan phalanx to occupy Olympus, and placing his cavalry, interspersed with infantry, on the sides of the road along the course of the  $\text{C}\epsilon\text{nu}\text{s}$ ,\* he gave the command of the mercenaries posted on Mount Eva to his brother Euclides. Strong alike in his position and in his genius, he still took the precaution to entrench himself throughout his whole line,† which, according to Polybius, was equally good for defence and for attack. Posted upon the crest of the heights, from points XVI. and XV. in the direction towards XII. and XI. (plan of Sellasia) along an extent of about 2200 metres (2400 yards), he was equally formidable by the strength of his defensive front, and by the inclination of the ground in advance of the whole of his right, which menaced the left flank of the Macedonians, should they attempt to cross the  $\text{C}\epsilon\text{nu}\text{s}$ , so decidedly that their crafty leader, after fruitlessly scanning at all points the admirable order of battle of the Spartans, despaired for many days of the success of an attack, notwithstanding his great numerical superiority.

If we calculate that a foot-soldier occupied, in the ancient order of battle,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet frontage ( $2\frac{3}{4}$  feet English), and that the phalanx fought 16 men deep, the disposition of the remainder of the Lacedæmonian infantry must have been 6 or 7 men deep.

SECT. D. *On the Order of Attack of the Macedonian General.*

Whether, as Plutarch alleges, on the authority of Philarchus, the Macedonian king had gained over some chiefs of the Spartan left wing—or whether, as Polybius maintains, the loss of the battle was mainly owing to an executive error of Euclides—Antigonus, whilst guarding against the menacing position of the right wing of Cleomenes, directed the bulk of his army and the élite of his troops towards his left, namely (comprising the great phalanx), about 12,000 Macedonians, 1000 Agrians, 1000 Gauls, 3000 mercenaries (infantry), making a total of 17,000 men, of whom 5000 were light troops. He opposed his 1200 horse with 1000 Achaians and 1000 Megalopolitans to the cavalry of Cleomenes, and he disposed in order of attack on his right 1600

---

\* The present road is 250 metres ( $273\frac{1}{2}$  yards) to the east of the  $\text{C}\epsilon\text{nu}\text{s}$ .

† At *x x x* (Plan of Sellasia) may still be seen remains of ancient entrenchments.

Illyrians, supported by the bronze-bucklered Macedonians, with 2000 Acarnanians (or rather Epirotes and Cretans), and 5000 Achæians, of whom 2000 were in reserve.

The Illyrians had penetrated, during the night, to the fork of the Gorgilos, at the foot of Mount Eva, where they remained in ambuscade. Antigonus,—on the left,—having posted as the advanced guard, his mercenaries and light troops, redoubled his phalanx in depth on account of the narrowness of the ground, not wishing to extend the lines of his heavy infantry along the rocky and uneven ground on his left wing (which at first was reclined backwards), making only some feeble attacks with his light troops, and holding his cavalry back until the movement of his right wing should be crowned by some signal advantage. The king (Antigonus) commenced the attack on his extreme right with the Illyrians and bronze-bucklered Macedonians, followed by other troops of that wing, who in their turn were supported by the Achæian reserve advancing towards the Gorgilos. There the Achæians were taken in flank and rear by the light infantry of Euclides (*a*), and placed in a very dangerous position, from which they were extricated by the brilliant charge of Philopœmen (*g. k.*). This detached movement, by disengaging the entire right wing from its perilous situation, decided the defeat of Euclides, and obliged Cleomenes, in order to compensate this disaster by a bold manœuvre, to advance from his entrenchments with the Spartan phalanx, by a movement of the left flank of his right wing, followed by the remaining troops of his right and the cavalry of his centre: a movement which, after an obstinate and alternately favourable contest, was followed by the complete victory of Antigonus, who, closing the files of his deep column, overthrew the Spartan phalanx, and drove them beyond \* their entrenchments.

SECT. E. *On the Isolated Charge of Philopœmen.*

The charge of Philopœmen, made before the concerted signal for the general attack of the centre and left of the Macedonians, decided the victory of the right wing of Antigonus. The young

---

\* The words here, “ἐκ τοῦ,” must be translated “beyond,” and not “out of,” since Cleomenes, who had already left his entrenchments to attack the Macedonians, was driven by them *beyond* his original position.

Plutarch relates that the Lacedæmonians had progressively pushed their offensive movement to nearly five stadia in advance; but Polybius asserts with more probability, considering the superior forces of Antigonus, that after the shock of the hostile phalanxes, sometimes the Macedonians yielded to the valour of the Spartans, and again the latter gave way before the strength of the Macedonian order of battle.

It may be, nevertheless, that some isolated bodies of light troops were driven towards *γγγ* (Plan of Sellasia), nearly five stadia (about 800 metres, or 875 yards) beyond the entrenchments of Cleomenes.

Megalopolitan, gifted with military tact, after having fruitlessly urged upon the royal commanders the necessity for an attack to paralyze the effect of the dangerous movement of the light troops of Euclides which had taken the Achaians in flank and rear, led on his fellow-citizens and attacked the enemy on his own responsibility. Polybius describes a conflict of cavalry, which recalled the light Spartan troops to the assistance of their brigade of horse; whilst Plutarch relates, in minute detail, how his hero defeated also even the light infantry. But Philopœmen, according to the narrative of his contemporary, having drawn with him his fellow-citizens—of whom, in the enumeration of the forces, 1000 were armed like the Macedonian infantry, whilst their cavalry must be comprised in the 300 select Achaian horse—it is evident that “all” the Megalopolitans followed their young and daring chief, unappalled by the boldness of the movement and the difficulties of the ground—circumstances which apparently prevented the principal chiefs of the right wing from acting, at least as much as the fear of doing so before receiving the orders of the king.

Antigonus, after the battle, having informed himself as to the isolated attack entered upon without his orders, the general of the cavalry endeavoured to excuse himself by asserting that it was made against his will by a headstrong young soldier. “General—replied the king—that young man has conducted himself like a great captain, and you like a young man!”

#### SECT. F. *On the Executive Error of Euclides.*

The defensive dispositions of the left wing of Cleomenes were excellent; but his brother, a less skilful soldier than himself, did not know how to profit by them. Seeing the movement of the Macedonian right wing “across” the ravine of the Gorgilos, he ought “at that moment” to have attacked the enemy from above, instead of losing the advantage of the position by permitting him to advance to the “summit” of the height occupied by his own troops, to combat there on equal terms, and to be thrust, in his own turn, into the ravine behind him (*z z z*, plan of Sellasia). The excentric movement of the Illyrians and the Acarnanians to outflank the left of Euclides, which Plutarch mentions, carried them (by *m m m* and *n n n*) on the flank of the Spartans; and whether the heights (*xvi.* and *xv.*) were yielded to them by Demoteles, or whether they were taken by assault, no sooner did Cleomenes (placed upon the eminence *xii.*\*) see the Illyrians and Acarnanians masters of his extreme left, than he judged his brother to be lost, and commenced his grand offensive movement to recover the day.

---

\* Plutarch, Life of Cleomenes.

SECT. G. *Loss of the Lacedæmonians at Sellasia.*

The loss experienced by the Spartans at Sellasia was enormous. Of 6000 Lacedæmonians, only 200 escaped the sword of Antigonus. In reality, driven beyond their entrenchments on the right, taken in flank by the victorious division descending from Mount Eva, they were lost without remedy, being forestalled upon their line of operation. If Cleomenes had not considered his affairs desperate, and if his loss had been less considerable, he might have hoped to arrest the enemy in the fine position of Sellasia itself, where two lines of defence of notable strength run across the great route. An enemy debouching from the high valley of the Cænus towards Sparta, would have no alternative but to force these lines in front, or to turn them by flank movements, always dangerous and almost always fatal, if an enemy has to be dealt with who, in point of strategy, knows the value of time and distance.

SECT. H. *Parallel between the Battles of Sellasia and Blenheim.*

The author next enters upon a discussion of the parallelism which had been set up between the battle of Sellasia and that of Blenheim; but he shows that those two military events in no wise resembled each other. At the conclusion of this section he remarks:—"If we may justly compare the brilliant manœuvres of the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy with the grand conceptions of Antigonus, we must not place in parallel the faults of Marshal de Tallard and the fine dispositions of Cleomenes; so true is it that we cannot too much admire either the victorious Macedonian or the vanquished Spartan."

SECT. I. *Highway from Thyreatis into Laconia.*

Sellasia not being at the convent of 'Aghios Seranda, but situated very near to the Khan of Vourlia, the great highway followed by Pausanias in his journey from Thyreatis into Laconia, could not lead by Kastanizza, as Colonel Leake has supposed, but rather by Kastri or Meligon to 'Aghios Petros, Arakhova, &c.

The following is a translation of the words of Pausanias: \*—"Proceeding from the Hermæ, the country is full of oaks; the place is called Scotita. At a distance of ten stadia to the left of the road is a temple of Jupiter Scotitas; a little further on, in the direct highway, is a statue of Hercules, on the left side of the road, with a trophy erected, it is said, by Hercules when he

---

\* Pausanias, in Lac., lib. iii., cap. x.

killed Hippocoones and his sons. A third turning, to the *right* of the highway, leads to Caryæ and to the temple of Diana. The place is dedicated to Diana and the Nymphs; and here is a statue of Diana Caryatis in the open air. Here also the Lacedæmonian virgins celebrate their annual dances, and one peculiar to the country."

"Returning into the high road and continuing the journey, we meet with the ruins of Sellasia, which was taken by the Achæians when they had defeated the Lacedæmonians under Cleomenes, the son of Leonidas. At Thornax (ἐν δὲ Θόρναξι), where you arrive afterwards,\* there is a statue of the Pythian Apollo, made like the statue of Apollo at Amyclæ, and beyond Thornax is the town of Sparta."

Information which I obtained accidentally at Vresthena from a Greek priest, who formerly, as a soldier, had served for a long time in Kynuria, and thoroughly knew the country, caused me to conjecture that the locality described by him under the name of Phonomenus (φονομένους), "the killed," must be the place of the tombs of Hippocoones and of the trophy of Hercules—a supposition confirmed by a singular tradition, which has been perpetuated from the earliest ages of Grecian antiquity to the revival of learning in Greece.

A decided opinion, though obscurely expressed, that the *three* frontiers met at the Hermæ and at a caryatid figure, was communicated to me by the same priest, and served as a guide to me in the darkness of my inquiry. We shall follow Pausanias in his description of the triple frontier at the Hermæ. (Corinthiæ, lib. ii. cap. xxxviii.)

"Beyond those towns (Athene, Neris, Eva) rises the mountain in which are contained the frontiers of the Lacedæmonians, toward the Argives and the Tegeans; the frontiers are marked by the Hermæ (boundary-stones) in marble, which give name to the place where they are found—'ἔστι δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ποταμὸς καλούμενος Τάνος.' Thence comes the river called '*Tanus*,' which is the only one descending from Parnon on the side of the Argives, and which falls into the gulf of Thyreatis."

We proceed successively to draw attention to the different natural features and the monuments mentioned by the traveller of antiquity, and to describe the remains of the latter, as they were found to exist by the author of these notes in his journey of 1834.




---

\* Colonel Leake thus translates this passage: "The next place in advance is Thornax." In the Archæological Maps of Müller, as well as in the French map, a *mountain named Thornax* is laid down, according to a construction at variance with the meaning of Pausanias. (See the note on Thornax.)

PLANS  
of Several Antiquities re-discovered  
in  
**LAONIA & CYNURIA**  
in following  
the Route of Pausanias  
from  
THYREATIS TO SPARTA.

Reference.





- A *The Temple of Jupiter Scotias.*  
B *The Site of that Temple in the Oak Forest of Scotita.*  
C *The Temple of Apollo at Thornax.*  
D *Inscription at the Monastery of Vresthènes.*  
E *The Tombs of Hippocones & his Sons.*




VIEW OF  
THE TROPHY OF HERCULES  
(OR TOMBS OF HIPPOCONES & HIS SONS.)

A



Scale of 25 Yards.



Ruins of a Watch Tower near Hermae.



The North East Front.



North East Front of the Ruins of the Temple of Jupiter-Scotias.

SECT. J. *On the Tanus and the Triple Frontier at the Hermæ.*

The natural frontier of Laconia toward the countries of the Argives and the Tegeans is between Castro-tys-Oreas and the village of Meligon, at from 500 to 600 mètres (547 to 656 yards) north-east of the fortress. The right bank of the Elipida, or river of Platanos, is there bordered by high-peaked mountains; on its left bank begins a gentle descent and a general fall toward the Thyreatic gulf. Castro-tys-Oreas is 400 mètres (437 yards) southward of the high road from 'Aghios Petros to Meligon and Astros; and opposite to this castle, at 150 mètres to the north of the highway, are the principal sources of the Elipida, which immediately afterwards precipitates itself in cascades into its channel towards Platanos, where it supplies water to the mills at all times of the year. A little beyond Platanos it is joined by the river of Kastanizza, and it afterwards enters the sea at 'Aghios Andreas.

The Elipida, as Colonel Leake has already observed, is evidently the Tanus, which is the only channel here having water in summer, and on that account deserving the name of a river. The French geographers have taken the river of Loukon, rising at 'Aghios Petros, for the Tanus, probably by reason of its course; but the latter is *without water* during six months of the year, and has its source toward the site of the temple of Scotitas, and not at the Hermæ. Either, therefore, Pausanias is incorrect, or the Elipida is the Tanus, and takes its rise 500 *metres* (547 yards) before arriving at Castro-tys-Oreas, the Hermæ being on the high road at the natural frontiers. The river Loukon does not in any way realise the latter description.

About half way between Castro-tys-Oreas and Meligon, upon the summit of a small hill, are the ruins of an Argive watch-tower, the plan of which is presented in the sketch.

SECT. K. *Temple of Jupiter Scotitas, and the Oak-Forest of Scotita. The Trophy of Hercules*

The road from the Hermæ, at the sources of the Tanus (or Elipida) towards Sparta, leads straight by the modern villages of 'Aghios Petros and Arakhova. Indeed, the most practicable route from Parnon, in this direction, is between these villages, the former of which is situated on the eastern declivity of Mount Parnon, and the latter on its western side. The distance between Aghios Petros and Arakhova is about an hour and a half. On leaving the Tanus, the country begins to be wooded about three quarters of an hour or an hour before reaching 'Aghios Petros; and the oak-forest, properly so called, extends to beyond Vambakou on the south (*see the map of Cynuria*), as far as the village of Vourvoura to the north, and to the confluence of the river of Vresthëna with the



Œnus to the west. This fine forest diminishes annually in density as well as beauty, in consequence of the cutting down of timber for building purposes and for fuel.

The site of the temple of Jupiter Scotitas in this forest, six stadia on the left of the high road, is exactly at this said distance on the left of the bridge of 'Aghios Petros. The present ruins are those of which the dimensions are given in the sketch. The peasants of the neighbourhood have, in a great measure, destroyed the materials of the temple by cutting and breaking the beautiful blocks (which are of very hard limestone) into small pieces, partly for the construction of their houses and partly to sustain the terraces of their fields, or else to form their boundary walls.

It takes three quarters of an hour to walk from the bridge of 'Aghios Petros to the place now called *εἰς τοὺς Φονιμένους*, "the killed," almost half way between that village and Arakhova. The three pyramids on the left of the road, in the proportions indicated (A, letter E), are the remains of the monument, called that of Hercules, and erected in memory of his victory over Hippocones and his sons. The tradition relative to it has escaped oblivion, because from day to day, and from age to age, Parnon has been crossed by these defiles, and the traveller has continually seen this monument of antiquity.

#### SECT. L. *On the site of Caryæ.*

As no ancient author has recorded the distance from Caryæ, on the right to the high-road from Thyreatis into Laconia, we must have recourse to other means to verify its site. These are furnished by the military movements and the encampments of Quintius and of Philopemen, and also by the description of the localities of this region by Pausanias. In a country deficient of water, the movements of armies are regulated by calculations of the supply of this principal necessary of military life. It is a general rule, and one which gives great facility in researches of this nature, always to take into consideration the marches of the commanders of antiquity, in order to arrive at safe or nearly certain results. As we are here only concerned with a description of the route taken by Pausanias, we need but observe that the "indication" on our map of the site of Caryæ exactly corresponds with the accounts of the military movements reported by Livy. I will add that the parts adjacent to the present ruins on the banks of the river of Vourvoura, and the position laid down as that of the temple of Diana, on a slight elevation in the middle of the plain, present one of the most charming landscapes of that part of the Peloponnesus, —so much so, indeed, that this place, by its fertility, beauty, and freshness in summer, considering the elevation of its plateau,

deserved to be chosen for the festive assemblies mentioned by the Greek traveller.\*

The ruins of Caryæ, situated on the borders of the plain and of the mountain, are those of a pretty large town; and in the spots marked *a—a—a*, may be seen on the rocks long traces of chariot wheels.

We shall presently have an opportunity of recurring more particularly to Caryæ, when treating in detail of the strategic movements of the ancients between Tegea and Sparta; but first we will continue to follow Pausanias down to his arrival at the last mentioned city.

SECT. M. *On the Temple of Apollo at Thornax.*

“After returning into the high-road, and continuing the journey, we meet with the ruins of Sellasia, which was taken by the Achæans, when they had defeated the Lacedæmonians under Cleomenes, son of Leonidas. At Thornax, which is the next place reached, there is a statue of the Pythian Apollo, &c.”†

The road from the ruins of Sellasia to Sparta leads by the modern village of Voutiani, and the ford of the *Ænus*, near the hamlet of Pavleica. At Voutiani this road divides, or rather, the ford may be reached by two roads. One of these immediately descends into the bed of a rivulet, (nearly always dry,) being a tributary of the *Ænus*, and falling into it almost perpendicularly. The other road, somewhat more to the west, runs parallel to the first, but over the top of the mountains, which from Voutiani slope towards the *Ænus* and Eurotas, as far as the villages of Kourti, Kokla, &c., where the plain, properly so called, commences. It is at Kourti, precisely on the limits of the plain and the mountain, that we find on one of the last undulations of the ground, at 120 mètres (131 yards) westward of the road, the ruins of the temple of Apollo, a sketch of which is to be seen in the plan indicated by the letter C; and this position corresponds exactly with the description of the site of Thornax given by Xenophon‡ in his narrative of the expedition of the Thebans against Sparta after the battle at Leuctra. According to this passage, Thornax could not be a mountain, as indicated in the archæological map of Müller, and in the French map of the Morea. Several houses (at present in ruins) of the hamlet of Kourti were constructed from “ancient stones,” and materials of the temple are found in many churches on the banks of the Eurotas, and on the left bank of the Kéléfina (*Ænus*).

\* Paus. Lac., cap. x.

† *Ib.*, cap. x.

‡ Xenophon, *Hist. Græca*, lib. vi., cap. v.

SECT. N. *On the Strategic Movements of the Ancients in that part of the Peloponnesus sketched in the annexed Map.*

Besides the campaign of Epaminondas against Sparta, antiquity furnishes narratives or mention of several important deeds of arms which have been achieved in the territorial triangle comprised between Tegea, the sources of the Tanus, and Sparta, or more properly speaking, between Caryæ and the two last named points.

It is justly considered of importance to determine with exactness, and either according to positive indications, or by the best founded calculations of probability, the different military positions; first, because by these means we shall at once be enabled to gain fixed points to start from in our ulterior researches,—and in the next place, with the view of clearing up several passages in the esteemed work of Colonel Leake, who, by mere accident, followed the road from Astros by the defile of Kastanizza to Sparta, instead of taking the road of 'Aghios Petros, where he would doubtless have found the same monument and ruins which the author of these Commentaries has been enabled to discover.


It is unnecessary to insist on the discrepancy which must have presented itself to the mind of the learned English archæologist in his endeavours to recognise the ancient sites. He himself acknowledges that, in order to make, for instance, the position of Hermæ (which he supposes to have been situated in the defile of Kastanizza\*) agree with the Hermæ on the frontiers of Laconia, Tegeatis, and Argolis, he is obliged to introduce two different lines of frontier.

“It is no objection to this conclusion (of the Hermæ being in the pass of Kastanizza) that Pausanias says *in the same passage*, that the Hermæ in Mount Parnon were the Lacedæmonian boundary towards the Tegeatici as well as the Argeia. A Hermæum in the pass of Kastanizza could indeed ‘not’ have separated Laconia from the Tegeatici; but there may be *another* Hermæum on the Tegeatic frontier towards Vervena and the sources of the Alpheus; on the ridge between Vervena and St. Peter’s (‘Aghios Petros) there may have been a common boundary of all the three districts.”

This last observation, the result of the author’s knowledge of ancient topography, is extremely just and judicious; and a glance at the map, and the notes made on the threefold frontier and the sources of the Tanus, will convince the reader, that fixing the position of the Hermæ near Meligon is the only solution of the different questions belonging thereunto, and especially their position relative to that of Caryæ. Before entering, however, into a close dissertation on the situation of that place and of its environs, we

---

\* Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. ii., p. 524.



Philagman in ambush in the Forest of Sontha moving by other troops the environs of Sellasia.

Philipman encamped at Mt. Barbosthene before the battle against Zenobia between Mt. Barbosthene & Tybatha 272 A.C.

Titus Quintus encamped at Tyre 295 A.C.

Philagman encamped at Tyre 192 A.C.

References

- a. Ancient Carriage tracks near Tyre and also on the
- a. great road from Tyre between Bassara & Tyria
- b. Ancient Conduit at Mt. Vresthenes
- c. Usani
- D. Route of Eusebius

Scale of 10000 Yards



MILITARY SKETCH

of a Part of

LACONIA AND GYNNURIA

showing the Sites of the

Antiquities & Cities mentioned by Pausanias

BETWEEN THE HERMÆ & SPARTA

& explaining the Strategic movements of the Ancients  
IN THAT PART OF GREECE.



Explanation.

- █ Camp of Epaminondas advanced towards Sparta, after the Battle of Leuctra (see the Temple of Thermis).
  - █ Philip, offering battle to the Spartans after the affair of the Medonides.
  - █ Battle of Salamis.
  - █ Philopomen, in ambush in the Forest of Sœtia, ravaging by order troops the environs of Salamis.
  - █ Philopomen encamped at Mt. Barbosthena before the battle against Xanthi between Mt. Barbosthena & Lyrtia. (Cæsar 192 A.C.)
  - █ Titus Quintus encamped at Ceryæ 195 A.C.
  - █ Philopomen encamped at Ceryæ 192 A.C.
- References
- a. Ancient Carriage tracks near Ceryæ and also on the a. great road from Thera between Bassara & Lyrtia.
  - b. Ancient Conduit at Mt. Vresthena.
  - c. Eastern
  - D. Route of Pausanias

shall be obliged to follow Livy in his relation of the manœuvres of Philopœmen against Nabis in the year B.C. 192. After taking into consideration other passages of the same historian, describing the march of the Roman consul Titus Quintius, and after having perused the account of the expedition into the forest of Scotita by Philopœmen against Nabis, as it is narrated by Polybius in his 'Universal History,' we shall be enabled to determine the sites of different places, and the military positions which these authors mention.

As to the expedition of Philip of Macedon against Sparta, it is described in the notes on the taking of Thermus. Livy\* tells us that Philopœmen, after having assembled his forces at Tegea, considered them in a condition to resume the offensive:—

“On entering the enemy's country he encamped the first day at Caryæ; and on that very day Gythium was taken. Ignorant of that event, Philopœmen advanced to the Barbosthenes, a mountain 10 miles from Lacedæmon. On the other side, Nabis, after taking possession of Gythium, set out at the head of a body of light troops, marched hastily by Lacedæmon, and seized on a place called the camp of Pyrrhus (Pyrrhi Castra), which post he did not doubt that the Achæans intended to occupy. From thence he proceeded to meet the enemy. From the length of their train, in consequence of the narrowness of the road, they (the troops of Philopœmen) spread over a space of almost 5 miles. The line was closed by the cavalry and the greatest part of the auxiliaries, because Philopœmen expected that the tyrant would attack him in the rear with his mercenary troops, in whom he placed his principal confidence. Two unforeseen circumstances at once filled him with uneasiness; one, the post at which he aimed, being preoccupied; the other, the enemy having met him in front, where, as the road lay through very uneven ground, he did not see how the battalions could advance without the support of the light troops. . . .

“On this occasion, he first ordered the army to halt; then sent forward to the van the auxiliary Cretans and the horsemen called Tarentines, each leading two spare horses; and ordering the rest of the cavalry to follow, he seized on a rock which stood over a rivulet, from which he might be supplied with water. Here he collected together all the baggage, with all the suttlers and followers of the army, placing a guard of soldiers round them; and then he fortified his camp as the nature of the place required. The pitching of the tents in such rugged and uneven ground was a difficult task. The enemy were distant not more than 500 paces. Both drew water from the same rivulet, under escort of light troops, but before any skirmish took place, as usual between men encamped so near to each other, night came on. It was evident, however, that they must unavoidably fight next day at the rivulet in support of the watering parties. Wherefore, during the night, Philopœmen concealed, in a valley remote from the view of the enemy, as great a number of targeteers as the place was capable of hiding.

“At break of day, the Cretan light infantry and the Tarentine horse began an engagement on the bank of the rivulet. . . . The enemies' watering party was also guarded by Cretan auxiliaries and Tarentine horsemen. The fight was for a considerable time doubtful, as the troops on both sides were of the same kind, and armed alike, but as the contest advanced the tyrant's auxiliaries gained an advantage, both by their superiority of numbers, and because Philopœmen had given directions to his officers, that after maintaining the contest

---

\* Tit. Liv., lib. xxxv., cap. xxvii., &c.

for a short time they should take to flight and draw the enemy on to the place of the ambuscade. The latter, pursuing the runaways, in disorderly haste, through the valley, were most of them wounded and slain before they discovered their concealed foe. The targeteers had posted themselves in such order as far as the breadth of the valley allowed, that they easily gave a passage to their flying friends through openings in their ranks; then starting up themselves, hale, fresh, and in regular order, they briskly attacked the enemy, whose ranks were broken, who were in confusion, and were besides exhausted with fatigue and wounds. The victory was no longer doubtful: the tyrant's troops instantly turned their backs, and flying with much more precipitation than they had pursued, were driven into their camp. Great numbers were killed and taken in the pursuit, and the consternation would have spread through the camp also, had not Philopœmen ordered a retreat to be sounded, for he dreaded the ground (which was rough and dangerous to advance upon without caution) more than he did the enemy. Judging both from the issue of the battle and from the disposition of the enemy's leader, in what an apprehension he then was, he (Philopœmen) sent to him one of the auxiliary soldiers in the character of a deserter, to assure him positively that the Achæans had resolved to advance next day to the river Eurotas, which runs almost close to the walls (of Sparta), in order to intercept his way, or that the tyrant could have no retreat to the city when he required it, and to prevent any provisions being brought thence to the camp; and that they intended at the same time to try whether any could be prevailed on to desert his cause. Although the deserter did not gain entire credit, yet he afforded to one who was full of apprehension, a plausible pretext for leaving his camp. On the day following he (Nabis) ordered Pythagoras, with the auxiliaries and cavalry to mount guard before the ramparts, and then marching out himself with the main body of the army, as if intending to offer battle, he ordered them to return with all haste to the city.

“When Philopœmen saw their army marching precipitately through a narrow and steep road, he sent all his cavalry, together with the Cretan auxiliaries, against the guard of the enemy, stationed in the front of their camp. These, seeing their adversaries approach, and perceiving that their friends had abandoned them, at first attempted to retreat within their works, but afterwards, when the whole force of the Achæans advanced in order of battle, they were seized with fear, lest, together with the camp itself, they might be taken; they resolved, therefore, to follow the body of their army, which by this time had proceeded to a considerable distance in advance. Immediately the targeteers of the Achæans assailed and plundered the camp, and the rest set out in pursuit of the enemy. The road was such that a body of men, even when undisturbed by any fear of a foe, could not, without difficulty, make its way through it. But when an attack was made on their rear, and the shouts of terror raised by the affrighted troops behind reached to the van, they threw down their arms and fled each for himself, in different directions into the woods which lay on each side of the road. In an instant of time the way was stopped up with heaps of weapons, particularly spears, which, falling mostly with their points towards the pursuers, formed a kind of palisade across the road. Philopœmen ordered the auxiliaries to push forward, whenever they could, in pursuit of the enemy, who would find it a difficult matter, the horsemen particularly, to continue their flight, while he himself led away the heavy troops through more open ground to the river Eurotas. There he pitched his camp a little before sunset, and waited for the light troops which he had sent in chase of the enemy. These arrived at the first watch, and brought intelligence that Nabis, with a few attendants, had made his way into the city, and that the rest of his army, unarmed and dispersed, were straggling through all parts of the woods; whereupon he ordered them to refresh themselves, while he himself chose out a party of men, who, having come earlier



into camp, were by this time recruited both by food and a little rest ; -and ordering them to carry nothing but their swords, he marched them out directly, and posted them in the roads which led from two of the gates, one towards Pheræ, the other towards the Barbosthenes; for he supposed that through these the flying enemy would make their retreat. Nor was he mistaken in that opinion; for the Lacedæmonians, as long as any light remained, retreated through the centre of the woods in the most retired paths. As soon as it grew dusk and they saw lights in the enemy's camp, they kept themselves in paths concealed from view, but, having passed it by, they then thought that all was safe, and came down into the open roads, where they were intercepted by the parties lying in wait, and there such numbers of them were killed and taken, that of the whole army scarcely a fourth part effected their escape."—(*Tit. Liv.*, lib. xxxv., ch. 27, 28, 29, 30.—Transl. by C. Edmonds, Bohn's edit.)

In order to understand the narrative of Livy, and to connect with it the data furnished by other passages of which we have treated, we must first of all determine the position of the frontier town of Caryæ, and then of the neighbouring localities, Mount Barbosthenes, Pyrrhi Castra, and lastly Pheræ; because when these points are settled, and some observations have been made on the nature of the ground where all these operations took place, we shall become enabled to understand the manœuvres and strategic movements of the ancient generals.

As respects Caryæ, we have already seen from Pausanias, that beyond the trophy of Hercules, a turning to the right of the high road from Hermæ to Sellasia and Sparta led to this town, which, as we have learned from Livy, was on the frontiers of Tegeatis and Laconia. The same author informs us, that the consul Quintius,\* after reaching Caryæ from Tegea, left it for Sellasia, from which place he went and encamped opposite Sparta, on the banks of the Eurotas.

The positions of Sellasia, of the trophy of Hercules (which is three quarters of an hour to the east of the village of Arakhova), and of Tegea, being known, the site of Caryæ can be no longer doubtful, as it must lie aside, between Tegea and Sellasia, on the right of the high road, passing from Astros to the last-mentioned town and Sparta, or, in other words, half way between the trophy and Tegea. The ruins, therefore, of a tolerably large Hellenic town, situated on the left bank of the river of Vourvoura, half an hour distant from the village, towards the west, can only correspond with the remains of Caryæ, which, by its position on a river containing "water" at all seasons, was an excellent intermediate station between Tegea and Sellasia,† or rather between

---

\* "Quintius laid entirely waste the country around Argos; then broke up his camp, crossed Mount Parthenius, and passing near Tegea, encamped on the third day at Caryæ, where he awaited the auxiliary forces of the Allies before entering the enemy's territory."—*Tit. Liv.*, lib. xxxiv., cap. 26.

† "Quintius having finished his preparations, broke up his camp and arrived on the second day at Sellasia on the Cénus, at which place, it is said, Antigonus, King of Macedonia, engaged in a great battle with Cleomenes, King of Sparta.

Tegea and the place where Antigonus fought the great battle with Cleomenes, viz., the modern khan of Krévata, at the confluence of the Œnus and Gorgilos. The latter has, during the whole summer, fresh and good water, rising from a source in Mount Eva itself.

The direct road from Tegea to the Khan of Krévata, viz., to the defile formed by the Mounts Olympus and Eva, passes through the narrow precipitous pass of Klissoura. It is from nine to ten hours in length, of which at least seven are amongst mountains, without any water except at Kriovrisi, and at the Khan itself.

The road by Caryæ and Arakhova is three quarters of an hour, perhaps an hour longer; but we find here not only good ground for encampment and water at Caryæ (midway), but a route much less fatiguing, leading through shady and plentifully-watered valleys. It appears also that the ancients preferred to go by way of Caryæ. Their armies then passed through the wood of Scotita, the actual extent of which is indicated in the military plan of a part of Laconia and of Cynuria, and which at present corresponds very well with the description given by Polybius in his details of the stratagem of Philopœmen at the head of the Achaians, assembled secretly by his orders at Tegea to act against Nabis, tyrant of Sparta.

The Achaian general lay concealed in the forest of Scotita, between Tegea and Sparta,\* in the neighbourhood of Scotita, whilst a portion of his troops were sent in advance and hid themselves near

---

Being informed that the ascent from thence was by a difficult and narrow road, he made a slight circuit by the mountains, and having sent in advance a party of soldiers to prepare the roads, he arrived, by a good and wide route, on the banks of the Eurotas, where that river passes almost immediately under the walls of the town.—Liv., lib. xxxiv., cap. 28.

\* "Philopœmen having, by messages sent to the different Achaian towns, assembled the troops of the league at Tegea, without having awakened the suspicion of the agents of Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, and in fact without the Achaians themselves knowing his real intentions, put his stratagem into execution. . . .

"Having then formed his plan, he, on the very day that he awaited the Achaians, detached a body of troops from Tegea, with orders to hide themselves during the night in the neighbourhood of Sellasia, and early on the following morning to make incursions into the territory of the Lacedæmonians. Then, when the mercenaries of Sparta had been assembled, his soldiers were to retreat *towards Scotita*, and there to await the orders of Didascalondas of Crete, to whom he had confided his plan.

"These measures being executed, he ordered the Achaians to sup early and then to march from Tegea. Having continued his march with all speed during the whole night, he arrived at daybreak and took his position secretly in the neighbourhood of Scotita, which is situated between Tegea and Sparta.

"The Spartan mercenaries in garrison at Pellene, having been informed at daybreak by their advanced posts that the enemy were making incursions, came out immediately and made their attack with all their wonted impetuosity.

"The Achaians retreated conformably to their orders, hotly pursued by the mercenaries, until having reached the spot where the rest of the Achaians were in ambuscade, the Spartan mercenaries were all of a sudden surrounded, and to a man either killed or made prisoners.—Polyb., lib. xvi. cap. 21.

Sellasia, from whence, on the day following, they were to make incursions into the Lacedæmonian territory.

The last corps was, in all probability, concealed in the neighbourhood of the modern village of Vourlia, from which several roads lead to the banks of the Eurotas; and, according to the orders given to Didascalondas, the chief of this expedition, the latter drew the mercenaries into the snare laid for them by Philopœmen, viz., into an ambuscade between Sellasia and Caryæ, in the forest of Scotita.

Having thus removed the difficulties which presented themselves to Colonel Leake as regards the solution of the military questions concerning Caryæ and the forest of Scotita, we shall now pass to the details specially relating to the movements and manœuvres of Philopœmen against Nabis, on the ground comprised between Mount Barbothenes, Pyrrhi Castra, and Sparta, and we think that the determination of the hitherto unrecognised situations of the two former localities will be the result of this examination, which will, therefore, appear not destitute of historical and geographical interest:—

Philopœmen, having advanced from Caryæ to Mount Barbothenes, ten miles, or eighty stadia, from Lacedæmon, continued his march on Pyrrhi Castra, already occupied, unknown to him, by Nabis, who had hastened to that place from Gythium, passing close to Sparta, when the two hostile armies met on the road, evidently between Barbothenes and Pyrrhi Castra.

Philopœmen, surprised for a moment, immediately changed the disposition of his army by strengthening his vanguard, and, after a skilful engagement, in which on the following day he gained a signal advantage over his adversary, whom he enticed into an ambuscade, he compelled the Spartan general precipitately to abandon his camp, although the retreat could only be made through a defile so dangerous and narrow “that no army, even when not harassed by an enemy, could have succeeded in effecting its passage without difficulties.”

The Achaian commander, perceiving the enemy thus disadvantageously engaged, sent his light troops in pursuit, upon which the Spartans, throwing away both arms and baggage, escaped, as well as they could, into the woods and by-ways.

Meanwhile Philopœmen, having arrived in person with the heavy troops on the banks of the Eurotas, by a road through a more open country, and having been the same evening joined by his light-armed force, detached several corps along the roads leading from Sparta to Barbothenes and Pheræ, in order to intercept the fugitives who were returning during the night to Lacedæmon, and in the end killed or captured the greatest number of them. (*See Livy, lib. xxxv. cap 27, &c.*)

We see, by this recapitulation of the military operations, first, that Mount Barbosthenes, between Caryæ and Sparta, was eighty stadia distant from the latter capital, and that Pyrrhi Castra was a place beyond Sparta in the direction of Barbosthenes. Moreover, we see that between Barbosthenes and Pyrrhi Castra there was a dangerous and very difficult defile, and that a better road led through a more open country from Barbosthenes towards the banks of the Eurotas; and lastly, we learn that there existed two high roads, of which the one led directly from Sparta to the above-named mountain, and the other from Sparta to the town of Phæræ.

On examining the sketch which we give of that part of Laconia, there can be no doubt that the modern Mount Vresthenes, a day's march, or about 15 miles, from Caryæ, is the Mount Barbosthenes of the ancients. The distance of eighty stadia from thence to Sparta is quite exact, and etymology gives a complete support to this suggestion, Vresthenes being but an abbreviation of the ancient name of Barbosthenes.

Two roads lead from Mount Vresthenes to Sparta, one of which, being the direct route, passes near the mills of the village of Bassara, beneath the hamlet of Calivia, by Dorissa, a little to the north of Morou; the second runs by Bassara, crosses the very narrow defile of Marina, one of the most difficult in Greece, leaves the Church of 'Aghios Constantinos a little to the left, and descends from the hills of Aphisson into the plain of the Eurotas.

At a quarter of an hour's distance from the Church of St. Constantinos towards the east are the ruins of two ancient forts, now called indiscriminately *Viglia-Castri* and *Petri-Kést*, evidently contractions or corruptions, in one form or another, of *Pyrrhi Castra*, the position of which, moreover, according to Livy, could not be anywhere but here or in the neighbourhood. Indeed, as no other ancient ruins exist in the vicinity, there cannot be any doubt as to the identity of the site of Pyrrhi Castra and Petri-Kést, where are still to be found the remains of two ancient forts, at a distance of from four to five hundred yards from each other. The road from Crysapha to Aphisson passes between the two hillocks, which are crowned by fortifications. On the flanks and on the summits of these heights, as well as at the Church of 'Aghios Constantinos, are also to be found numerous ancient tombs.

The richly-wooded defile of Marina is, therefore, the passage which became so fatal to the army of Nabis, when retreating towards Sparta, and on the banks of the rivulet of Bassara the battle between the armies took place. A *second defile*, existing between the place of the combat marked in the map and of the village of Bassara, was that chosen for the ambushade laid by the Achaian general for his adversary.

The march of the heavy-armed troops, under the immediate command of Philopœmen, was effected by the direct road from Mount Vresthenes to Sparta, by way of Dorissa; and, in fact, that road runs through a far more open country, for it lies along the slopes of 'Aghios Theologos, etc.\* (See Tit. Liv., lib. xxxiv., cap. 28.)

As regards the roads where Philopœmen intercepted the fugitives hastening to Sparta, we have already sufficiently described the roads of the Barbosthènes, and it only remains to be added that the ruins of the ancient Pheræ have been found by the author half an hour distant to the N.N.E. of Verria, the name of which clearly proves it to have succeeded to the town mentioned by Livy.†

We see at Pheræ, amongst other ruins less worthy of note, those of an Hellenic temple, but they are in little better preservation than those of Scotita and Thornax.

The road from Bassara to Verria displays numerous traces of ancient chariot-wheels, some of which are very long and deep.

The high-road from Sparta to Pheræ, according to the formation of the ground, passed by Aphisson and the defile of Marina, and near the villages of Bassara and Verria.

(The remainder of the paper is occupied with critical notes upon the observations of the Chevalier de Folard on the battle at Sellasia between the forces of Antigonus and Cleomenes.)

---

\* The road from Vresthenes to Sparta is joined near the mills of Bassara by a road running from the Khan of Krévata along the banks of the Œnus. It was by this road that the Consul Quintius descended to the banks of the Eurotas, when from the spot, "where it is said that Antigonus, King of Macedonia, gave battle to Cleomenes, tyrant of Sparta," he (the Consul) made "a slight circuit" in the mountains in order to march on the Eurotas by a good road.

In reality, as Livy observes, the ascent from the camp of Quintius towards Sellasia, by the common road, running along the foot of the modern Paleogoula (see the Map), is rough in many places.

† Βέρροια. The Βέρροια of Macedonia seems to have been the same as Φέραϊ, which name was carried in the ancient Peloponnesian form into Macedonia by the Argolic colony. Some of the Peloponnesians were partial to the letter Β in the room of an initial aspirate, as in the instances of Βοίτυλος, Βοινάα, for Οίτυλος, Οινωί. Verria therefore seems to have preserved its present form from Pelasgic times.

---

---